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After the collapse of the USSR, Estonia, as an independent state, had to deal with a large population of 
Russian-speaking minorities, who immigrated or were born there during the Soviet times. The Estonian 
government had to introduce numerous policies and complete its way from a nation-building state to a 
multicultural one.    
The aim of this research was to find out whether the Estonian Integration Program may be related to the 
multiculturalism policy, on which it was based. In order to do this, theory of liberal multiculturalism by Will 
Kymlicka was introduced and compared with the current situation in Estonia. Furthermore, this thesis aimed 
to find out young people’s attitude towards this term. Qualitative content analysis was applied to analyze 10 
interviews with the Russian-speaking side and a ‘mini-survey’ of 10 representatives from the Estonian-
speaking side. The Estonian mass media was also analyzed to give the additional information on the present 
setup in the state. 
As one of the aims of multiculturalism is to preserve one’s ethnic identity, it was crucial to find out whether 
Russian-speakers associate themselves with ‘Russians’.  Results have shown that the Russian-speaking 
minority in Estonia has various ethnic identities – strong Russian, insecure Estonian-Russian and Alternative 
identities. This fact may speak of assimilation process that takes place in Estonia, as the Estonian-speaking 
youth did not have adjacent identities. In addition, the results of the thesis have shown that Estonians have a  
less positive attitude towards multiculturalism, as their aim is to preserve their small nation’s culture and 
language. 
As a result, Estonia still has several aspects to consider and implement in order to be fully included into the 
number of multicultural states. However, progress in adapting multicultural policies has already been observed.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the research problem  
After regaining independence in the beginning of the 1990’s, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
were the first ones among post-soviet republics to integrate into European society 
(Galbreath, 2003: 35). However, close ties with European organizations, democratization 
and economic benefits did not let them avoid great ethnical concern, the so-called ‘Russian 
question’ that arose in these countries, especially in Estonia and Latvia.  Lithuania at some 
point has escaped this issue, as the population of Russophonic minorities was not that large 
at the end of the Soviet era (9.4% against 38.5% or 48% in Estonia and Latvia). 
Furthermore, from the very beginning Lithuania has instituted more liberal policies towards 
its minorities by submitting citizenship for all the residents of the state (Galbreath, 2003: 
36). Estonia and Latvia at the same time had to deal with the consequences of mass 
migration of Russians after WWII. 1 
If we focus on the case of the Estonian Republic, we may state that it had rather long 
relations with national minorities. Baltic Germans, Swedish communities were among 
them from the thirteenth century (Piirimae, 1997: 50). Upper class of German community 
was widely represented in the population of Estonia until the middle of the 20th century: 
historically they were described as ‘conquerors and exploiters of the peasantry’ (Kalmus, 
2003: 672 in Petersoo, 2007: 122), and furthermore, their dominance was literally 
associated with ‘hundreds years of slavery’ (Made, 2003: 184-185 in Petersoo, 2007: 122). 
However, long-standing Russian minority also existed in Estonia from the 17th century, 
when Russian ‘Old Believers’ (vanausulised) settled mostly on the coast of Lake Peipus 
(Petersoo, 2007: 123). They were also known as peipsivenelased. According to the 1897 
Census, Russian-speaking minority comprised of 4% of Estonian population (Jansen, 2004: 
92,111 in Petersoo, 2007: 123). These long-standing settlers were described in a positive 
way, as they were not only able to preserve their ethnic identity, but also become bi-linguals 
with a distinct immersion into Russian culture and religion. They were also presented as 
                                                 
1 After WWII the population of titular nation in Estonian and Latvian Republics comprised of 88% and 77%. 
At the end of the Soviet era the numbers had changed to 69% and 59%  (Smith, 2001:23). 
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good example for post-war Russian immigrants, when the latter expressed their concerns 
over changing their identity.  (Petersoo, 2007: 123).  
The second group of Russian-speakers has moved to Estonia after the World War II. The 
demographic situation was greatly changed as the percentage of ethnic Estonians fell from 
94 to 64 per cent during the years 1945-1989 (Smith, 2002: xxiii in Petersoo, 2007: 124). 
The fear of being dissolved among Russian-speaking immigrants, who were, in addition, 
perceived as illegitimate invaders, has changed the attitude towards Russian-speakers in a 
negative way (Petersoo, 2007: 124). In 1992, Trivimi Velliste, the Minister of Foreing 
Affairs, has claimed that it was improperly to call Russian-speakers as a minority, when 
‘legally, this word referred only to those Russians, who lived in Estonia before 1940. The 
rest were described as ‘colonists’’ (Lieven, 1994: 307 in Petersoo, 2007: 124). Some kind 
of cultural boundaries were also the reasons why these two ethnic communities clashed. 
The first reason is in the language – Estonian belongs to the Finno-Ugric family, while 
Russian is Slavic one. Religion also differs – Estonian Lutheran Protestantism versus 
Russian Orthodox Church. Kolsto (1996: 624) also highlights the difference in the cultural 
chasm, which separated Estonians from Soviet Russians (Petersoo, 2007: 124-125). 
 In 1991 government restored state’s policy of national citizenship that took its roots from 
the pre-war times. According to it, only those residents could obtain Estonian citizenship, 
whose relatives lived in a newborn Estonian Republic before the year 1938.  In addition, 
the Estonian Republic ratified the Estonian language as the official, thus immediately 
cutting off rather large population stratum of Russian-speaking minorities.  
In this situation, Russian-speaking minority in Estonia has turned out to be ‘lost’ after the 
collapse of the USSR, as the nation-building process in Estonian Republic took its place. 
Furthermore, the knowledge of official language was also a great concern for Russian-
speaking community. However, pressure from various European organizations and Russia 
has weakened some of the policy’s requirements. For example, Citizenship Law was 
accused of being too rude in 1992 (Norgaard et. al, 1999: 204).  Thus, by the end of the 
1990’s government’s policies have changed dramatically, turning their vector towards 
democratic values. Estonia has adopted integration strategies and established Integration 
Foundations that would have helped organizing all the necessary activities (Toots & Idnurm, 
2011: 118).   
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The case of Russian-speaking minorities in post-soviet states has attracted researchers’ 
attention from not only Estonia (Vetik 2000), but from different parts of the world (Kolstø 
2002, Kymlicka 2002, Norgaard 1999). However, the adaptation process of Russophonic 
minorities was mostly examined on adult population. Recent studies (Pfoser 2015, Schulze 
2012, Smith 2015, Nimmerfeldt 2008) have shifted attention towards Russian-speaking 
youth that was mostly born and raised in independent Estonia.  Unlike their parents, who 
mostly associated themselves with Russian Federation or USSR, they had different identity 
formation. Learning of Estonian language is also not a great concern for them, as most of 
them learned it at schools or obtained higher education in Estonian. Younger generations, 
according to Korts (2009: 13) are similar with Estonians in their thought patterns in this 
case, as ‘the openness to the West and consumer culture has changed their point of view on 
the state’.  
Dialogue between two nations has been continuing for more than twenty five years: the 
theme is being actively discussed among elites and politicians in particular. Argues about 
division of two different cultures, language of instruction in schools and kindergartens as 
well as reforms of education in Russian- and Estonian-speaking educational establishments 
have also been hot topics for discussion. Majority group, as well as minority, are both 
interested in saving its cultures and languages, however debates Estonia in its integration 
program states that it is a multicultural country, which aim is to support everybody, whose 
cultural background differs from host society’s. In my research I would like to study what 
multiculturalism is, how is it perceived in Estonia among young generations and may 
current situation in Estonia and its variation of multiculturalism be described as an example 
of this notion.   
Studying the position of Russian-speakers in Estonia is relevant to the subject of 
International Relations because of the interstate relations between Estonia and Russia. The 
relations between these countries were strained due to different views on political 
background, integration programs, which were suggested by the Estonian government and 
political or social events, which took their place during these years. However, my thesis 
attempts to address this question from the point of view of identity and multiculturalism, 
and in particular, the views on identity and multiculturalism of both Estonian- and Russian-
speaking youth.  
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1.2 Theoretical framework 
In my thesis, I decided to study integration processes regarding Russian-speaking minority 
in Estonia with the help of the theoretical model of multiculturalism. I expect it to be 
relevant in this research for several reasons:  
1) Multiculturalism and identity are closely related, as ethnic identities, as well as other 
social identities, form modern social reality. Historically, for some minorities, one’s 
ethnic identity was a feature that should have been hidden or stigmatized during the 
years (Kymlicka, 2012: 100). However, post-war era, its democratic ideologies and 
freedoms have proclaimed multicultural policies for those, who were denied and ignored 
before.  Tolerance and liberal values are also vital for European states and that is why 
multicultural policies are welcomed and are sought in European society.  
2) Multiculturalism has been the basic model in Estonia’s integration programs from the 
year 2000. Though Estonian government adapted the model of the multicultural state in 
its own way, it is still important to have understanding of what multiculturalism actually 
is.  
In the literature review on multiculturalism, I have examined numerous concepts of the 
notion. However, the most defining one is Will Kymlicka’s liberal theory of 
multiculturalism. The position of the Canadian scholar is one of the ‘toughest’ liberal 
models of multiculturalism. The foundation of his theory is the theory of liberalism and its 
thesis on equality of rights and opportunities for everyone. Kymlicka states (Kymlicka, 
2007: 13) that  critics dispute multiculturalism as it ignores so-called civic values, which 
develop the common field of belonging to a socio-cultural and social community. It is 
believed, that this model does not take into account special rights of individual groups. As 
a reaction to this, ideas of ‘differentiated citizenship’ emerged, which implied the existence 
of not only individual rights, but also group rights that differ from the general legal model. 
Kymlicka insists that vital interests, connected with culture and identity and fully 
compatible with liberal values of freedom and equality, justify the endowment of minorities 
with special rights. Liberal state should provide non-titular nations with such conditions that 
would help them preserve their basic cultural values, even if the partial integration takes 
place. These measures would only equalize social existence by reducing the vulnerability 
of a smaller group to a larger group and not to diverge from the attitudes and values of 
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liberalism (Kymlicka, 2007: 13). 
However, I have also included literature review on multiculturalism from other researchers 
who are similar in their views on this policy. They mostly agree that the cultural 
independence will lead to one’s identity preservation, which is crucial for modern liberal 
states.  
Vetik (2000) in his research proposed that there were two different approaches that suggest 
their way in dealing with minorities. One of them, modernist, emphasizes that strong 
common core should be a basis for uniting people of different cultures in a state. 
Postmodernist approach at the same time suggests that different cultures should have 
opportunity to preserve their culture and roots. Naturally, different ethnocultural groups will 
try to defend their interests – minorities will mostly be against the first model, while 
majorities will be for saving their culture and language. Estonian model of multiculturalism 
at the same time suggests that people of different nations and cultures should preserve their 
cultural and ethnic identities, however uniting around Estonian language. Loyalty to the 
state and high proficiency in national language are seen as common ground for uniting 
people of various origins in the Integration program. Estonian case with Russian-speaking 
youth is interesting one, as for young people the term ‘Estonian Russian’ or ‘Russian in 
Estonia’ or ‘Russian-speaking Estonian’ is getting more popular on the contrast with their 
parents, who had strong ‘Russian’ or ‘Soviet’ identity (Pfoser, 2015). Scholars admit (Taylor 
1994, Wolf 1994, Berry 2011) that multicultural policy is closely related with identity 
construction as it may keep one’s idea of who he is and preserve one’s cultural or ethnic 
identity. In this case, self-esteem and identity construction will not be lost. Still, tendency 
for spreading non-confident Russian identity for me is alarming factor that mostly speaks 
of assimilation processes. However, this identity is also characterized as ‘multicultural 
identity’ (Valk et. all 2011: 33) 
 
1.3 Research gap 
Previous research concerning Russian-speaking minorities was done by David J. Smith 
(2003), who investigated the case of Estonian nation-building process and the integration 
policies that Estonia has adapted during the decade of independency. In his work he 
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describes a process of transformation from ‘ethnic democracy’ to a new strategy of a 
‘multicultural integration’ that was proposed by Kymlicka (2002). However, the new 
integration strategy that had been adapted several years before the article was published was 
too young to trace real changes in the society. Besides, the study was mostly analytical and, 
for example, did not aim to reveal people’s attitude towards the changes in integration 
politics. 
Toots & Idnurm (2012) investigated perception of cosmopolitanism, nationalism and 
multiculturalism differs among young people of Estonia, Latvia and Russian Federation. 
Their research revealed that Estonian youth has more cosmopolitan views, than, for example, 
Latvian. In addition, their study was different from the one that was conducted in 1999, 
when Estonia has paved her way towards democracy. From those times, according to Toots 
& Idnurm, Russian-speaking youth has also become more tolerant and open-minded. 
Even though in previous studies ethnic identity of Russian-speaking youth and their attitude 
towards political and social systems was analyzed and compared with the youth from the 
Russian Federation, I have not come across any studies that would contrast Estonian- and 
Russian speakers in their views regarding  multiculturalism in Estonia. In this case, I would 
like to know whether their views on governmental politics regarding multiculturalism differ 
from each other. Furthermore, I would like to combine the notion of identity and 
multiculturalism and to see how they complement each other.   
 
1.4 Research questions & hypothesis  
Having examined previous studies on Russian-speaking youth in Estonia, multiculturalism 
policy and Estonian integration programs that were adapted during the last twenty years, I 
have formed my research questions as such: 
1) How do Russian- and Estonian-speaking young people view multiculturalism 
policy in Estonia?  
2) Are there differences in their views? Does ethnic identity influence the perception 
of multiculturalism policy? 
3) According to the notion of multiculturalism, as defined by Will Kymlicka, may 
the current situation in Estonia be described as such? 
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Hypothesis:  
According to the review of previous studies my hypothesis is the following: there will be 
a different view on multiculturalism between majority and minority population: Russian 
speakers will have a more positive attitude towards multiculturalism as their aim is to 
preserve Russian culture and language in Estonia. Estonians, on the contrary, will have less 
positive or even negative reaction concerning multiculturalism, as they will perceive 
multiculturalism as a threat to the Estonian language and culture.  
 
1.5 Method & Data 
My research material consists of several types of data: 10 interviews with the 
representatives of Russian-speaking youth and a ‘mini-survey’ with a sample of 15 
contacted and 10 responded representatives from the Estonian side. The ages of young 
people vary from 17 to 28 years old. Half of the interviews was taken during the spring 
2017, while another half was conducted during the autumn 2018. 
Furthermore, Estonian mass media was also analyzed to give an additional information on 
current situation on minority issues in the state.  
Qualitative content analysis was used as a tool for working with the analysis of the 
interviews. During the research, I also refer to previous studies while analyzing my own 
material. So I apply both primary and secondary material in my research. I used both 
decriptive and explanative methods to analyze and draw conclusions on my data. 
  
1.6 Thesis structure 
I decided to divide my research into five parts: theoretical framework, literature review and 
research background, data & method chapter, data analysis and conclusion. The theoretical 
part aims to discuss the concepts of multiculturalism and identity. The third chapter is 
concentrated on the ‘historical’ background of the integration policies and laws that were 
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adopted by the Estonian government for more than 25 years. The fourth chapter, data & 
method, more thoroughly describes the way the interviews were conducted and analysed. 
The fifth chapter is dedicated to the analysis of interviews and speaks both about identities 
of Russian-speaking youth and Estonians, and about their attitude towards multiculturalism. 
In the conclusion, I sum up the results of my research and answer the research questions.  
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: MULTICULTURALISM AND ETHNIC IDENTITY  
2.1 Literature review on Multiculturalism 
In the theoretical part of my thesis, I introduce  previous studies on multiculturalism policy. 
This would be essential for comparing multiculturalism in the way it is adopted in Estonia 
with the main points it itself represents in international discourse. However, the most 
defining study is Will Kymlicka’s liberal theory of multiculturalism. I will introduce his 
theory on ethnic minorities and their rights as a group to demand political rights and/or  
right to preserve their culture.  
It is needless to say that integration is a very important theme in social sciences and the 
concept has various interpretations. During the times, the issue of integration has developed 
theoretical viewpoints that helped to study the effect of immigrant groups on host society. 
Such concepts as assimilation, adaptation, acculturation, inclusion and integration, as well 
as pluralism and multiculturalism became widely used by the scholars. 
There are two extremes in integrating minorities or immigrants, according to Rodríguez-
García (2010: 253): assimilationist and pluralistic or multicultural. The first one implies 
minorities to adopt fully to host society’s rules and values, while pluralistic model means 
cultural diversity. Brubaker (2001: 41) argues that the ‘assimilation’ term has gained such 
a bad name and is associated with the worst excesses of Americanization campaigns. For 
Gans (1992: 48) nowadays ’one can be judged by using words such as assimilation and 
acculturation; one may also be considered as an old-fashioned or even antipluralistic’. 
However, early theoretical views on integration were assimilationist as it adaptation was 
seen as necessary and unavoidable (Park and Miller, 1921) and these authors were criticized 
for ethnocentric and nationalist ideas (Schunck, 2014: 10).  
The second notion, opposite to assimilationist, according to Rodríguez-García (2010: 253), 
is mostly known as multiculturalism. Multiculturalism as a term appeared in European 
countries after 1945 as a reaction to political concerns of that time. The first one they had 
to deal with was regarding immigration issues and immigrants’ settlements in Western 
Europe in the 1950s and 1960s. The break-up of Communism in 1989 revealed problems 
with national minorities not only in the Baltic States, but on the rest of the post-communist 
territories, too. Besides that, a growing number of political refugees and asylum-seekers in 
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Western Europe was also a great concern (Rex, 2004: 8). ‘Terrorist attacks in the United 
States and the subsequent expansion of American influence at the same time arose dangers 
posed by unassimilated immigrant groups’ (ibid.). John Rex (2004) placed these political 
situations within a general theory of multiculturalism. For Rex, Europe had three basic 
ways of dealing with immigrant ethnic minorities after 1945 (Rex, 2004: 8). France chose 
an assimilationist policy in its politics. Another way was a gastarbeiter system in German-
speaking countries, which gave no political citizenship to the immigrant workers. The third 
approach was multiculturalism typical to Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK. However, 
some countries adapted their own form of multiculturalism with greater or lesser emphasis 
on civic equality (Rodríguez-garcía, 2010: 254). 
Over the last 25 years philosophers and social scientists actively discussed multiculturalism. 
For example, political philosophy tried to characterize a successful liberal society.  ‘Such 
a society, it had been thought, would involve the guarantee of the rights of individuals’ 
(Miller and Walzer, 1995: 320 in Rex, 2004: 9). 
Bhikhu Parekh (2000) in his research wonders if the culturally separate groups can exist 
together within a shared society. He decides that not only they can, but also should exist 
this way and such co-existing should be welcomed. He assumes that societies with single 
cultures are not competitive nowadays. It is important though that all cultures should be 
given equal respect and rights (Parekh, 2000: 379). 
Some authors like Sheila Patterson (1963) considers integration to be a step to ‘absorption’, 
which is an end of assimilation process. These theories of assimilation were criticized by 
the multiculturalism advocates (Rex 1996, Soysal 1994, Parekh 2000). Parekh in his work 
(2000) states that minority groups have the right for their own lifestyle and non-recognition 
of their rights may lead to defiance of their interests. He (Parekh 2000: 197) also argues  
that the assimilationists consider society to be a systematic and consolidated cultural and 
moral framework, but in fact, this is not true. This structure or framework is not a unified 
whole. There are differences in class, region and religion that are constructed from different 
stands that sometimes may even conflict with each other.  This understanding is ignored by 
assimilation policy and instead the interests of dominant group are privileged by giving a 
national culture a crooked value.  
For Charles Taylor, multiculturalism builds its base on unity of identity and recognition 
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(Taylor, 1994: 25). Thus, democracy, as a construct that means mutual recognition in 
different forms, implies multiculturalism to acknowledge various cultures. Identity, at the 
same, time consists of recognition and its absence. It is the way person defines itself by 
artistic manifestation or communicating: either with others or with himself / herself 
(Ghender, 2016: 159).  
Susan Wolf, who shared Taylor’s ideas about identity, emphasizes that the absence of 
recognition is rejection of minorities’ cultural identity. Furthermore, it is the denial of its 
importance and value. The consequences of such an attitude may lead minorities to feel 
low self-esteem as well as unvalued and unwelcomed group among the host society. This 
situation will mostly remind of a cultural assimilation (Wolf, 1994: 75). For Wolf, 
recognition does not depend on value of certain culture, but it is a rightful need for a cultural 
diversity (Wolf, 1994: 85).  
 
2.2 Will Kymlicka’s theory of multiculturalism 
Will Kymlicka in his work ‘Contemporary Political Philosophy’ (2001) argues that modern 
liberal states often take part in nation-building process, which encourages common 
language, common sense of membership in social institutes that function in this language, 
and equal access to them (Kymlicka, 2001:440). He wonders how nation-building process 
influences these minorities and quotes Charles Taylor thoughts that nation-building puts 
majority’s culture in a privileged position: 
‘If a modern society has an ‘official’ language, in the fullest sense of the term, that 
is a state-sponsored, -inculcated, and -defined language and culture, in which both 
economy and state function, then it is obviously an immense advantage to people if this 
language and culture are theirs. Speakers of other languages are at a distinct disadvantage. 
(Taylor 1997: 34 in Kymlicka, 2002: 22) 
This means that minorities are facing a choice if all the social institutes are operating in 
another language: whether they 1) migrate, especially if there is a migration-friendly state 
nearby that is ready to accept them, 2) reconciliate with the integration into majority’s 
culture, trying to negotiate fairer terms of integration 3) struggle for their rights and self-
government authority, necessary for support of their societal culture – economic, political 
and educational institutes, 4) reconciliate with marginalization (Kymlicka, 2002: 22).  
Kymlicka (2001) distinguishes several types of minority groups: national minorities, 
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immigrant minorities, isolationist ethno-confessional groups, metics (e.g. Turkish 
Gastarbeiter), African Americans. Situation with Russian-speaking minorities may be 
related both to the national minorities, as well as immigrant group. Kymlicka describes 
national minorities as nations that right now do not have their own state, or they had such 
state earlier. They also occurred to find themselves in a new country with another nation 
due to various reasons. Furthermore, Soviet identity may serve as an evidence that former 
state of residence, with which Russian-speakers associated themselves with, is a different 
country that may not even relate to modern Russian Federation right now, though it existed 
once (Pfoser, 2015). Immigrant minorities are mostly described as groups that voluntarily 
decide to change their residence in search of better living conditions. 
On the one hand, Russian-speaking minorities indeed gushed out to Estonia after the WWII, 
as the population of Russian-speakers increased dramatically during post-war times: 12% 
to 39%  by 1989 (Smith, 2015: 1). However, Russian-speakers do not have claims to their 
own nation-building process in Estonia or ask for autonomy – that is why ethnic / 
immigrant minority option is more suitable in their case. 
 Kymlicka points out that previously Western states tried to suppress minority population 
by assimilating them in the dominant culture. Over the past decades Western states tried to 
abandon assimilation politics in favor of ‘immigrant multiculturalism’, which did not let 
immigrants to push forward one’s societal culture fully, but nevertheless supported them 
in saving their customs and provide them with language rights (Smith, 2003: 6).  
Kymlicka argues that historically immigrant groups reacted to nation-building less 
desperately than national minorities, who asked for autonomy, for example (Kymlicka, 
2001: 447). On the contrast to the latter, their population is too small and territorially 
scattered to try reconstructing their own societal culture. Often, they accepted integrational 
strategies that were suggested to them. Indeed, most of them did not mind to learn the 
national language for obtaining citizenship or for daily communication. Thus, immigrants 
do not resist nation-building campaigns that would involve them into the dominant group. 
However, what Kymlicka claims is that in ‘immigrant’ states minorities try to negotiate 
better conditions of these integrational processes. They demand more tolerant and 
‘multicultural’ approach of integration, which would help them to preserve different 
aspects of their ethnical heritage (ibid.).  
It should also be mentioned that national minorities, according to Kymlicka, should be 
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granted all the rights for cultural and territorial autonomy, if they wish to have it (Kymlicka, 
2002). This is relevant not only for indigenous peoples, but also for small nations that 
historically happened to be ‘swallowed up’ by another state. Kymlicka states that 
suppressing these kinds of minorities was and always is a big mistake, as their identity 
changes quickly. Sense of belonging to some culture or nation may disappear easily and 
that is exactly what Western countries tried to do to get rid of ‘otherness’ in their state. It 
was done by closing minority-language schools and prohibiting customs (Kymlicka, 2002: 
26). Nevertheless, attempts to dissolve minorities in majority population were later 
recognized as counterproductive and unworkable, as it was more profitable to allow 
minorities to ‘live their lives’ rather that constantly be ‘in war’ with them (Kymlicka, 2002: 
26-27). 
Kymlicka points out that historically, until 1960s, immigrant countries followed the politics 
of assimilation. Immigrant minorities were expected to learn cultural norms of host society 
and practically be undistinguishable from the majority population in speech, manners, 
clothes, recreation, cuisine, identity etc. Too noticeable ethnicity was seen as ‘non-
patriotric’ (Kymlicka, 2002: 34). However, assimilationist approach is more and more 
recognized as neither necessary, nor justified. Canadian scholar insists that immigrant 
minorities should demand or insist on more fair conditions of integration, as host society 
should accept the fact that integration may not be done in one day: that means that 
immigrants should have an opportunity to get help in their language in public spheres, for 
example. Furthermore, it is necessary that common institutes would provide the same level 
of respect, acceptance and considerate their ethnic identity. If liberal democracies will 
promote common institutions to operate in official language, then these measures should 
at least be fair (Kymlicka, 2002: 34). 
 Multiculturalism in this case, in contrast to assimilationist politics, allows individuals, as 
well as minority groups, freely identify themselves with one or another culture and preserve 
their ethnic identity. Liberal state, according to Kymlicka, should provide ethnocultural 
minorities with special rights and support basic cultural values of these groups (Kymlicka, 
2007: 13-14).  
Some critics, as Kymlicka states, worry that multiculturalism itself rejects the possibility 
of minorities to integrate and participate in majority population’s social life (Kymlicka, 
2002: 35-36). On this statement, Kymlicka responds that the statement is untrue, as an 
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immigrant society is not interested in marginalizing, but rather seeks for a better life, 
especially if it migrated from less stable or economically poor country. They know that the 
only way to achieve success is to get involved into new society and socialize there. 
However, they still seek changes in public spheres, such as schools, workplaces, welfare 
agencies etc. and to reform these institutions in order to get hold of greater recognition of 
their ethnocultural identities (ibid.). 
Kymlicka (2002: 54-58) also urges to distinguish liberal nation-building that suggests 
immigrants to integrate and get involved into the host state, with nation-building that 
illiberal democracies try to promote. Some features may be less evident, some of them are 
more distinctive, but main ones that differ liberal democracies from illiberal ones are such: 
1) Common national identity may be promoted in both cases, but still liberal democracies 
are less likely to impose penalties on those, who decided to stay outside the majority 
population. 
2) Liberal states have less strict policies in public space and more expansive in private, 
where national identity may be revealed: e.g. official language must be used in 
parliamentary debates, but at the same time posters and brochures may be printed in 
different languages unlike illiberal states, where often agitating must be held in official 
language. 
3) In liberal states, one can choose for itself, whether he / she wants to join the nation; in 
some illiberal democracies one can only be included if he / she has a specific surname, 
ethnically ‘pure’, religiously suitable etc.  
4) This idea continues with the statement that liberal democracies welcome anyone, who 
wants to join the nation and more quickly become fully members of the state if he / she 
wants to learn the language, participate in public sphere and common institutions. One’s 
origin is not that important in this case. By contrast, illiberal democracies often demand 
cultural integration, as well as accepting the same lifestyle, religion etc.  
5) Liberal democracies do not see nation as a supreme value, though it is valuable – but 
rather as a context in which we share individual values, such as family, faith, pastimes. 
Illiberal democracies often see nation as an important value and, for example, may even 
define women as a ‘bearer of nation’. 
6) Unlike illiberal democracies, liberal ones are getting more cosmopolitan in their views: 
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this process involves more tolerant and caring attitude towards ethnic identities and their 
cultures; they may also borrow some practices and, in general, be more opened to other 
cultures. Illiberal democracies, on the contrary, often trace ‘purity’ of the nation and do not 
seek to enrich it with another trends. They try to hide their authentic culture and this process 
may sometimes lead to xenophobic and intolerant rhetoric. 
These are some basic distinctions between nation-building states. As Kymlicka points out 
(2001), nation-building is an essential process in state’s construction. Nation-building, at 
the same time, should not prevent immigrants to get involved into host society’s ‘life’. 
Immigrants may not get full access to independent existing and governments cannot 
provide everybody with comfort living as one had in the country of origin. However, 
multicultural approach denies ignoring of ethnic minorities and tries to soften their 
residence with less stressful integration, endowing them with rights and opportunities to 
preserve their ethnic identity. Thus, ‘immigrant multiculturalism’ must be promoted in 
liberal states to preserve ethnocultural pluralism in the society and rights should be granted 
for minorities in order to control that no one is discriminated.   
 
2.3 Kymlicka’s implementations of the theory in the Baltics 
Kymlicka has also observed case of the Baltic States and tried to apply multiculturalism 
policy to Estonia and Latvia (2002). In his work, he admitted that Russian-speakers, who 
were freely and legally moving around one country, do not see themselves as immigrants, 
rather perceive themselves as ethnic minorities and have rights to think so. However, the 
Estonian-speaking side claimed them to be unwanted and illegal migrants and their point 
of view may also exist. Different perception of shared historical background thus helped 
them to find their own way of integration, combining immigrant model and some form of 
national cultural non-territorial autonomy. Attempts to lead out Russian-speakers by 
denying citizenship to the ethnic Russians did not succeed, as most of them decided to stay 
(Antane and Rsilevich, 1998 in Kymlicka, 2002: 78). Indulgence in obtaining citizenship 
was seen as a way to integrate a large scale of residents with ‘zero’ citizenship, though the 
number of Russian-speaking institutions continued to reduce. In Kymlicka’s opinion, this 
measure was obtained to inspire Russian-speakers that they were ‘immigrants’ still, and 
that is why their aim was to integrate if they would like to be included into public spheres 
of Estonian society (Kymlicka, 2002: 78). He also states that many Russians, as he calls 
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them in his work, accepted these policies as a measure that would help them and their 
children to integrate. Surveys also showed that many of them (Laitin, 1998: 202 in 
Kymlicka, 2002: 78) accept that ‘nationalizing’ program, including the requirement to learn 
the titular language. 
Kymlicka points out that immigrant model of integration – together with cultural autonomy 
– might work if both sides rethink their attitudes (Kymlicka, 2002: 78-79). Majority group, 
in this case, should also include ‘immigrant’ minority to integrate and succeed in 
mainstream institutions (ibid.). In Kymlicka’s view, many Russians were afraid that perfect 
command of Estonian and loyalty to the state would not guarantee them participation in 
public institutes. In his opinion, these statements may be seen as demonstrations of distrust, 
and partly that is membership for many Balts is defined in terms of blood, so no cultural 
integration will provide their acceptance (Laitin, 1998: 126-7, 256 in Kymlicka, 2002: 79). 
However, latest (on that moment) integration strategy on immigrating minorities have 
stated that this process is two-sided, so Estonians should also allow minorities integrate.  
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3. REGAINING INDEPENDENCE: INTEGRATION POLICIES OF ESTONIAN REPUBLIC 
TOWARDS RUSSIAN-SPEAKING MINORITIES 
In the third part of my thesis, I would like to speak about the steps the Estonian government 
has made in order to integrate Russian-speaking minorities: from restoration of 
independence until nowadays. Furthermore, I will highlight the evaluation and attitude of 
European organizations towards these policies, as well as Russian Federation’s position on 
this issue. I will also give a brief description of multiculturalism policy, which Estonia has 
adapted. 
After regaining independence in 1990s, Baltic States were to accept nation building, but it 
was unclear at that time how these republics will manage their newly found sovereignty. 
Return and integration into European space was sought and was prevalent for Baltic Sea 
region, manifesting the state within the large geopolitical context. One of the methods 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have accepted in this case was engaging into nation-building 
process. (Jordan, 2014: 16). Rogers Brubaker identified this policy as a way to restore the 
primacy of titular nation. He also argued that ‘this mode was dominant among all of the 
states that re-emerged from the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia’ (Brubaker, 1996: 80-
83 in Smith, 2015: 80). 
Benedict Anderson describes nation as ‘imagined community’, a construct of post-
industrial age. He describes that the nation is imagined, as the members of one nation, even 
the smallest one, will never know each other, hear about them or meet, but in their minds, 
there will be image of their communion (Anderson, 2006: 6 in Jordan, 2011: 5). Nation-
building can be understood as a political project and a social process leading towards 
stronger national integration in modernizing states (Kolsto, 1999) and at the same time 
Kolsto argues that citizens of ethnic states hold membership automatically, whereas 
citizens from non-titular groups are seen as members of second order (Kolsto, 2002:16).  
At the same time, nation-building is always associated not only with the positive elements, 
but with the numerous conflicts that are referring to the different identities and interests in 
society. In the case of Estonia the Russian-speaking community and Estonian one pursue 
different goals: while the first ones try to avoid the assimilation losing their cultural identity 
among alien nation, emphasizing on the multicultural structure of the country, the second 
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ones suppose that the only way to integrate minorities is by imposing the national language 
in the all spheres of social and political life in Estonia (Kruusvall et al., 2009).  
 
3.1 Nation-building in the Baltic Sea Region 
The situation that may be now seen in the Baltic States cannot be viewed without a 
historical context in which Estonia, as its neighbors, too, were put during the history, 
especially the 20th century. After becoming independent states at end of the World War I, 
they soon had to suffer again from the Nazi Germany as well as later become a part of the 
USSR. This is a major point of disagreement between Estonians and Russian-speakers: 
Estonians see this act as occupation and annexation while the Russian Federation still 
insists on the fact that the inclusion of Baltic States was legally acceptable and actually 
many Western countries officially acknowledged these three countries as a part of the 
USSR.  
The Soviet period (1944-1991) is characterized by ethnic Estonians as a period of severe 
repressions of the Estonian population during the World War II, industrialization, 
compulsory knowledge of Russian and the censorship of their own culture and everything 
that was ‘ideologically suspicious’. The wish for Western welfare, storing the national 
language became fundamental ideas of the state, as Russians migrated to Estonia during 
the Soviet times had the opportunity to speak and use their language in everyday life 
throughout the state (Goble, 1995: 125).  
The collapse of USSR has led to massive changes in not only political, but also economic 
and social life of these countries. The 25 million Russian-speaking population was left 
behind the borders of Russian Federation. During the Soviet times, the Russian-speaking 
population in Estonia increased dramatically: for example, in 1945 Estonian population 
was 94%, whereas by 1989 it comprised 61% due to the immigration of Russian speakers 
from different parts of the USSR (Smith, 2001: 23). This rapid growth of the minority 
population led to extremely low levels of Estonian language knowledge among Russian-
speakers and a high degree of social separation (Pettai, Kallas, 2009: 106). 
By the late 1980s Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania aspired for returning to independence. 
That’s why a lot of people gathered in the streets of these countries to ask for it. From the 
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1989, a ‘number of measures were adopted to re-establish the primacy of the Estonian 
language in every sphere of society. These measures followed the ‘assymetrical 
bilingualism’ of the Soviet Union’ (Smith, 2015: 80). In the spring of 1991, voters in the 
Baltic States were asked to declare themselves for or against independence. In the case of 
Estonia 78% said ‘yes’ to independence (Taagepera, 1993). 
 
3.2 First steps of nation-building: early citizenship policies 
In this situation, many Russian-speaking residents now found themselves in a foreign land 
without a political system and language of its own (Chinn & Kaiser, 1996). Besides that, 
according to the Citizenship act of 1992, ‘Estonian citizenship was given automatically 
only to the citizens of the pre-soviet republic of Estonian and their descendants, while non-
citizens should had gone through the naturalization process’ (Agarin, 2012: 449). 
Citizenship policies aimed to either assimilate or out-migrate Russian-speaking minorities 
(Schulze, 2014: 26). For Linz & Stepan (1996: 417) the citizenship policy was especially 
important, as refusal to give citizenship during these fundamental times of building a state 
has left almost 40% of stateless population behind the political life.  
In 1992, the government accepted the law of naturalization, which meant that three years 
of residency and language proficiency along with several examinations including 
knowledge of language and Constitution would be the requirements for acquiring Estonian 
citizenship.  
Naturalization was also not the easiest way to obtain citizenship, as language requirements 
frightened many of the Russian speakers from receiving citizenship as by the time of 
independence only very small amount of non-Estonians could speak new national language 
(Park, 1994: 73-74). As a result, about 32% of the population became stateless and 7% 
accepted Russian citizenship so not to become stateless at all (Schulze, 2014: 26). 
According to the statistics, only 6% of Estonians claimed this citizenship policy to be anti-
democratic and discriminating human rights, while approximately 71% of non-Estonians 
also thought the same way.  56% of Estonians argued that the policy is normal according 
to worldwide standards and only 17% of Russian-speaking respondents agreed (Eesti 
rahvussuhete seireuuring, 2000).  
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‘In 1992, several Human Rights groups, including Helsinki Watch, criticized the 
Citizenship Law for creating a population divided into Estonian citizens and mostly non-
Estonian ‘Russian citizens’. Western political scientists argued that the exclusion of ‘such 
a large part of the inhabitants from equal citizen rights, as is currently the case of Latvia 
and Estonia, obviously conflicts with a liberal perception of democracy’ (Norgaard et. al, 
1996: 204 in Budryte, 2011: 22). ‘In addition, in January 1995, the Citizenship Law was 
made even stricter. The residency requirement for those who had entered Estonia after 1992 
was changed from two to five years, the requirement to know the Constitution and 
Citizenship law spelled out, and the language requirement was tightened’. Protests from 
the President’s Round table on Minorities were ignored (Budryte, 2011: 21). The lack of 
language knowledge has lead to non-participation in political life, as the citizenship was 
hard to obtain.  
 
3.3 Language Policy & Education 
It may be claimed that Estonia does not have a legal line between different ethnicities, but 
at the same time it does exists in the form of the language barrier. In the 1990s the Estonian 
language was proclaimed as the only official language that would unite the whole society. 
In the reality, tightening of language policy by the Estonian government lead to difficulties 
among the Russian-speaking community.  
In 1998, the government adopted Language Learning Strategy for Non-Estonians. The aim 
of this document was to state that other languages are also welcomed and should not be 
ignored. It was necessary to integrate the society and break off the separation tendencies 
that were being seen. This strategy was planned for the years 1998-2012 and according to 
this strategy, the Estonian government planned to finance language promotion in 
educational grounds. Nowadays, language position is mentioned in Constitutional law.  
The situation with the knowledge of the Estonian language improves during the years. If 
in 1989 85% of non-Estonian had no command in official language, then in the year 2000 
22% of Russian-speakers stated that they are able to communicate ‘well’ (Kruusvall, 2000: 
135). Relatively new statistics in this field have shown that the language issue still 
improves. Especially it may be seen by comparing youth and older generations. For 
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example, 69% of non-Estonian young people aged 15-29 is able to speak Estonian well. 
Among 30-49 years old Russian-speakers 49% can speak official language, while among 
65-74 years old residents only 30% have a good command of the language 
(Paljurahvuseline Eesti, 2015).  
As to education reforms, after regaining Independence thoughts of rebuilding education in 
Estonia took place. It was planned to make the education in the Estonian language only by 
the year 2001 at the beginning, though later this plan was postponed to the years 2007-
2008.  However, soon after this idea was left behind as forcing Russian-speaking children 
to rapidly change their school instruction would have led to serious problems in the whole 
society due to poor educational results.  Besides, the educational system was not ready for 
total reformation of education. Needed amount of stuff with a required command of 
Estonian was also hard to find.   This situation lead to a thought that another way of dealing 
with minorities should be found. For example, a partial education as well as in Estonian 
and in Russian was suggested.  
Nowadays, higher education is mainly in Estonian, though there are still some programs 
left in Russian language, (e.g. teacher of Russian language). As to secondary schools, 
humanitarian subjects in Russian schools are already taught in Estonian. Such schools with 
language immersion may help forcing language learning. Today the percentage of lessons, 
taught in Estonian and Russian, comprise of 60% against 40% (Soll, 2015: 54).  
However, from the 1990’s already some parents have sent their children to Estonian schools 
and kindergartens. Their aim was to secure their kids from being ‘marginalized’, as this 
step could guarantee successful integration into Estonian society. 
In March 2019, parliamentary elections have showed the highest support for right-centered 
Reform Party, which promised in its election program to switch the language of teaching 
to Estonian-only.2 It included transition to education in Estonian not only in schools, but 
also in kindergartens. The Estonian president supported this initiative3.  
                                                 
2 https://ria.ru/20190304/1551521927.html 
3 https://ria.ru/20190224/1551314345.html 
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In Helsinki Decisions of July 1992, OSCE established a new position for a Commissioner 
on National Minorities. Explanatory Note on Minorities’ Educational Rights was published 
in October 1996 and regulated the importance of children to receive at least primary 
education in their native language, as well as in kindergartens. Bolzano/Bozen 
Recommendations also suggested general principles of inter-state relations between 
majorities and minorities. It declared that the state should not limit rights of minorities and 
to guarantee equality before the law for everyone. Estonia has also adapted a law on 
Cultural Autonomy of National Minorities in October 1993, which allows several groups 
of minorities, such as: Swedish, German, Russian and Jewish, form their own cultural self-
government, and to have the use of rights granted them by the Constitution in the field of 
culture. This document also points on the right of minorities to receive education in their 
own language.  
 
3.4 Review of the integration process in Estonia 
 After the collapse of the USSR about twenty-five million of Russian-speakers happened 
to find themselves in newly-formed states without distinct citizenship, identity, and to 
change their position from privileged to the status of ‘minority population’ (Brubaker, 1995: 
108). As Kymlicka has rightly observed, ‘many local Russians still find it hard to adapt to 
the idea that they are an ‘immigrant minority’’ (Smith, 2015: 208). Especially for the older 
population it was hard to adapt to the new policies and the new situation in the state. Large 
amount of population still had strong Soviet identity (Nimmerfeldt, 2012; Pfoser, 2014; 
Kolsto, 1996) that was not that easy to change. Estonians at the same time perceive non-
citizens that came to live during the occupation ‘immigrants’ as they do not admit the USSR 
annexation as legal one (Vetik, 2000:17).  
Alongside the restrictive trends, there were some elements of positive minority policy as 
well:  
a) Estonia took the bold step of according all permanent residents the right to vote at 
the municipal level in 1992. 
b) Estonia restored its much praised inter-war policy of cultural autonomy for 
minorities.  This constitutional provision was followed in 1993 by a Cultural 
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Autonomy act, which provided for the creation of minority voter rolls for the 
election of cultural autonomy boards.  
c) Minority language was allowed to use in those localities, where not least than 50% 
of residents were Russian-speaking. 
d) In January 1997 Estonia became one of the first countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe to ratify the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the protection 
of national minorities.  
At the same time, each of these concessions has its own drawbacks (Pettai & Kallas, 2009: 
109). By the late 1990s had serious problems in integrating minorities, which may be seen 
in governmental statistics.  
a) According to the 2000 census, Estonia had a population of 1.370.052 people of 
whom only 80 per cent had a citizenship. 
b) Naturalization rates had fallen from a high of 22.773 in 1996 to 3.090 in 2001 
(Kodakondsus- ja Migratsiooniamet 2006: 19 in Bijl & Verweij, 2012: 133) 
c) The labor market continued to be ethnically segmented and majority of non-
Estonians believed that ethnic Estonians had an advantage over them in a range of 
societal spheres including getting jobs, promotions or greater pay (Pavelson 2000: 
89-116) 
‘It was against this backdrop that the impulse began for the formation of a real minority 
integration policy’ (Bijl & Verweij, 2012: 130). New documents were suggested to 
integrate the minorities, though minority representatives criticized them for having 
assimilative tendencies, rather than to be multicultural-friendly. In this tense situation, 
Russian-speakers were aimed to adapt to the changing ethnic policy.  The breakup of USSR 
collapsed also the Soviet identity, which was the main identification frame for Russians 
and plunged them into the profound identity crisis (Kolsto, 1996: 609). Soviet identity was 
mostly based on civic and political unity with the state, rather than with concrete ethnic 
identity. It comprised of certain ideology, symbols and norms, as well as semantic place 
and communication (Nimmerfeldt, 2012: 261). In 1993 59% of Russian-speakers in 
Estonia have stated that they were still representatives of Soviet culture (Kirch and Kirch 
1995: 53 in Nimmerfeldt, 2012: 261). Furthermore, it is still one of the possible options in 
constructing one’s identity, together with the feeling of the Soviet nostalgia (Vihalemm and 
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Masso, 2007: 75 in Nimmerfeldt, 261). There are several reasons why Russian-speakers 
have experienced difficulties in identity formation: first one is that Russian-speakers, 
unlike Estonians, did not mainly identify themselves with some specific ethnicity, but 
rather had associated themselves with ‘Soviets’ (Vihalemm and Masso, 2007: 73 in 
Nimmerfeldt, 2012: 262). Secondly, Estonians have gone through the rise of national 
identity during the singing revolution and while regaining independence.  At the same time, 
Russian-speakers were put under the pressure after nation-building process had begun. 
Furthermore, they also had to deal with negative attitudes from the majority population, 
also had been blamed for years of Soviet occupation. (Ehala, 2008 in Nimmerfeldt, 2012: 
262). Kolsto (1996) has outlined several types of identities of Russian-speakers, or so-
called ‘new’ Russian diaspora in Baltic States: 1) those, who associated themselves mostly 
with Russia and its culture, 2) those, who transformed their identity into new identity, 
basically Russian one, 3) they could assimilate and associate themselves mostly with 
dominant culture in their state of residence. However, the most probable scenario for 
forming Russian-speakers' identity would be the second variant (Kolsto, 1996 in 
Nimmerfeldt, 2012: 262). Younger generations aged 18-35 mostly do not have connections 
with Soviet era and that is why ‘new’ identity for them is not something specific. However, 
Soviet identity of their parents could also influence theirs (Nimmerfeldt,  2012: 263). 
 
3.5 The role of European institutions in minority integration 
Various norms sets of the European Union were made to control the situation in new 
European states towards national minorities. They were regularized in several conventions, 
e.g. “Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities” (UN, 1992), the European Charter for the Protection of Regional 
and Minority Languages (COE, 1992), the Helsinki Decisions (OSCE, 1992), the 
Copenhagen Criteria for EU Accession (EU, 1993), the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (COE, 1994), and the “Oslo Recommendations 
Regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities” (OSCE, 1998) (Schulze, 2010: 
364). Their aim is to admit the right of minorities to protect their culture and language with 
the preservation of their linguistic and cultural identities, at the same time feeling 
themselves equal with majority group (Brosig, 2006: 27). Estonia has adopted all of these 
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policies, however the European Charter remained unsigned, as for the Estonian government 
the questions concerning language policies are still arguable (Brown, 2006: 69) 
In the situation where newly emerged post-Soviet states aimed to seek for the EU admission 
into the European space, these countries were obliged to fulfill the necessary demands.  
Influence of the EU has played its role in managing the integration process in Estonia. In 
the late 1990s progress has been made in the situation with Russian-speaking minorities. 
In 1998 the Estonian government adopted a document named the Integration strategy of 
non-Estonians into Estonian Society: the Principles of Estonia’s national Integration 
Policy.  This document included changes in language and citizenship policies. Furthermore, 
it was the first document, which marked the issue of minority population in its agenda. 
Exams were now easier to pass, naturalization process for children born to stateless parents 
was also simplified and a new integration program with the Legal Chancellor was created 
(Schulze, 2010: 365). In 2000 new program emerged: Integration in Estonian Society 2000-
2007. The first one was a dash in idea of ethnic policy in the country: it considered 
education to lead an important role in breaking the barriers between two different ethnic 
groups. It also reduced the number of stateless persons and in the end it was more open-
minded towards Russian-speaking population with a hope that Russians would be soon 
perceived as ‘resource’, not a ‘problem’ (Vetik, 2012: 29) At the same time this document 
has been criticized, too. ‘For example, Hanne-Margaret Birckenbach stated that: ‘the 
concept launched by the Estonian government prolongs the ethnic orientation of Estonian 
nation-building. It is based on ethnic priorities rather than on republican considerations. It 
aims at defending the ethnic dominance against international demands for equality’ 
(Birckenbach, 1998: 10 in Vetik & Helemäe, 2011: 49). The policy of the year 2000 made 
a new step in policy making. It represented the integration as a two-side process in which 
both Estonians and Russians should be involved. It aimed to find the balance between unity 
of nation and saving cultures in Estonia. State Integration strategy 2008-2013 has already 
weakened the stress on Estonian cultural dominance and admitted the existence of other 
cultures in the country (Cianetti, 2015: 140). The third document was based on the previous 
one, describing the integration as a peaceful coexistence. All the people living in the state 
should not be discriminated regardless of their ethnic origin and at the same time they 
should share the ideas written in the Estonian constitution and should take part in social, 
economic and cultural affairs. However, it was still criticized as the Estonian culture was 
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still on the top of the hierarchy, because of the significance of titular nation’s culture and 
the high value of official language’s knowledge (Cianetti, 2015: 199). The Strategy of 
Integration and Social Cohesion in Estonia: ‘Integrating Estonia 2020’ (SISCE) that was 
planned for the period from 2014 to the year 2020 is also not very much different from the 
two previous ones. What may be marked is that the strategy highlighting the necessity of 
developing multicultural society and guarantees the preservation of not only Estonian 
culture, people and language, but also the right for each other individual to preserve his or 
her ethnic identity (SISCE: 3). Individuals with a different cultural background at the same 
time participate actively in cohesive Estonian society and share common democratic values.  
However, several studies doubt that policies of EU for the minority rights in Eastern Europe 
have truly succeeded. As Schulze (2010) states in her article these requirements did not fill 
their maximum and have just accepted some minimum set of standards. The language 
examination was made easier but at the same time, it was not nullified for the elderly people. 
The government still rejects to give an automatic citizenship for children born to stateless 
parents (Shulze, 2010: 365). She claims that there is still no dialogue between two groups 
and this process is not a two-way one. Furthermore, there is no educating program for the 
titular nation concerning minority’s culture, language and the diversity of cultures and 
tolerance (Schulze, 2010: 365). 
Estonian ethnic policy, in fact, has shown both achievements and failures. The biggest one 
is that a large-scale violent conflict has been avoided (Kolsto, 2002). The main sources to 
check the effectiveness of the integration policy are sociological studies and surveys 
conducted (Laurustin & Vetik, 2000). The surveys reveal that there are pros and cons in 
integration dynamics. The positive sides are: knowledge of the Estonian language has 
increased, the contact between two ethnic groups has also increased, both groups recognize 
each other more etc. (Vetik, 2012:33). At the same time, negative trends reveal that the 
amount of non-citizens wishing to obtain Estonian citizenship decreased (that was the most 
surprising result), respondents had a weak trust towards the state and socio-economic 
inequality still takes place (ibid.). 
The above mentioned fact may be described as the biggest contradiction of the Estonian 
modernization project: on the one hand, the government aims to restore the unity and 
homogeneity of the state, and these attempts may be called as ‘nation-building’ (Vetik, 
31 
 
1999: 15). On the other hand, a large amount of minority population is being under the 
pressure of losing their identity. Estonian historical background is complicated and that 
makes the whole picture even vaguer (Vetik, 1999: 15)  
However, researchers as Will Kymlicka have already suggested the idea of political 
multiculturalism that would be suitable for today’s Estonia. It would be a good solution, if 
minorities would be given rights to political and cultural independence, while at the same 
time promising their loyalty to the present country of residence or birthplace.  
 
3.6 Russian Federation’s influence on minorities’ integration  
Not only European institutions had to regulate integration processes that took place in 
Estonia after 1991. Estonia needed to take into account Eastern neighbor’s demands 
concerning Russian-speaking minorities. Russia has declared itself as a ‘protector’ of 
Russophones in Estonia and convinced ‘Estonian government to change its restrictive 
citizenship and language policies’ (Melvin, 1998: 37 in Schulze, 2010: 366). Relations 
between Russia, Latvia and Estonia depended on ‘how the rights of ethnic minorities were 
protected in those countries,’ stated Alexander Yakovenko, Russian Foreign Ministry 
spokesman in an interview. (Daily News Bulletin, Moscow, 17.06.2002). He added that: 
 
‘More than just a purely abstract analysis of compliance with international 
standards is required. Top priority should be given to whether [laws] meet the 
legal interests of hundreds of thousands of people, whether they help resolve the 
key problems facing ethnic minorities, when a lot of people do not have any 
citizenship, as well as the restriction of language, education and other 
rights.’(Daily News Bulletin, Moscow, 17.06.2002) 
 
It is now hard to define, which side has influenced the decisions on policy making in 
Estonia the most – was it the European Union and its institutions or Russia. Their activism 
was strong and simultaneous. Furthermore, Russia has used different platforms, such as the 
UN, EU, OSCE and NATO to criticize Estonian policies (Schulze, 2010: 366).  
 
Researchers evaluate the citizenship policy, which was adopted by Russia and which 
granted holders of ‘zero citizenship’ the right to obtain Russian citizenship, in different 
ways. For example, Vetik (2006 in Schulze, 2010: 367) has argued that this measure has 
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affected naturalization policies and efforts of the Estonian Republic to integrate minorities. 
Those, who were excluded from the right to obtain Estonian citizenship, chose to apply for 
Russian one and this option has separated them from the newly made state even more. 
These residents tend to be the most poorly integrated and have greater loyalty to Russia, 
than Estonia (Schulze, 2010: 365). However, the situation when one has to exist with alien 
citizenship also tends to be discriminative and fear of being overboard of public life seems 
to be understandable and clear.  
 
Russia’s activism indeed created ambiguous or even defensive reactions among Estonian 
establishment, and has glowed the tensions between Russia and Estonia even more 
(Schulze, 2010: 366-367). The first big incident has occurred in spring 2007, when the 
Bronze Soldier was removed from downtown Tallinn. This crisis had a negative effect on 
relations between two countries (ibid.). Furthermore, it has raised to the surface the 
problem of division of two nations, which will be reviewed more detailed in the fifth part 
of my thesis.  
 
Russia’s response to the incident in April 2007 followed fulminantly. Pro-Kremlin youth 
groups organized protests in Russia and one of them blocked Estonian embassy. 
Furthermore, series of massive cyber-attacks on banks and websites have also spoiled 
relations of two countries (ibid.). Estonia has accused Russia of stirring up interethnic 
conflicts in media, as well as organizing rioting in Tallinn. Generally, the conflict, which 
has begun as the one between Russian-speakers and native Estonians, has turned out to be 
bigger matter with intervention of Russian government and media. It did not prevent the 
removal of the statue; however it cannot be unobvious that Russian government had an 
impact on this issue (Schulze, 2010: 368).  
 
3.7 Estonia as a multicultural society 
As both Estonians and Russian-speakers represent very different cultures, with a different 
view on their historical background (Petersoo, 2007), it is essential that the views on 
integration models that would be suitable for both groups may vary.  
There are modernist and postmodernist approaches that Vetik (2000) has discussed in his 
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work. It suggests that there are several models of dealing with national minorities. While 
on of them suggest creating one ‘whole nation’ that would share loyalty, culture and 
language, there is another one that insists that cultural pluralism is essential and should not 
be abandoned. Both discourses exist in Estonia and it is impossible to say which method is 
proper. For Estonians, who at last may proceed to nation-building after 50 years of 
occupation the first approach is viewed as suitable one. For Russian-speakers, it is 
perceived as injustice and nationalism towards a large amount of population. Both of these 
points of view are true and may have a right to exist.  
As already mentioned in the previous parts, some integration policies of the end of the 
1990s have lead Estonian researcher to the thoughts that a kind of multicultural shift in the 
integration policies takes place and this may be noticed while studying integration 
strategies of the years 1998 and 2000. Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2008 
represented by the Estonian Government was based on John Rex’s model of 
multiculturalism as it also speaks of the importance in public and private spheres. It may 
be summarized as such: cultural pluralism, strong common core and preserving of Estonian 
culture (Avikson, 2000: 52).  
Cultural pluralism in this case is described as possibility of minority cultures to preserve 
their language and culture, acquiring education in mother tongue, and adapting to the 
Estonian society, not assimilating.  
Strong common core in Estonian case is a sharing of behavioral and interaction models, 
values and attitudes.  
Development of Estonian culture and its preservation means that though Estonia will 
remain Estonian-centered cultural space, it does not mean that minorities should abandon 
their cultures in order to get involved into Estonian society. They should have possibilities 
to develop their own cultures, too (Riiklik programm, 2000: 19-20 in Avikson, 2000: 52)  
In addition, this document marks the necessity of finding the ‘golden middle’ in unity and 
difference. The unity is seen in knowledge of the official language and obtaining citizenship, 
while differences are seen in recognition of cultural pluralism. Furthermore, integration 
should not be considered as a one-sided process, which comes from one or another side 
only, but rather to be a shared intention. The key issues for the Estonian researches and 
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social scientist was to combine these parallel terms into one framework and in the 
Integration Strategies 2014-2020 these challenges were broadened with such integration 
aims: 
1) The openness of society should be increased, including Estonian-speaking 
population, that would support integration strategies and their attitude towards it 
would be friendly 
2) Supporting permanent residents with culture and languages different from 
Estonian  
3) Adaptation and integration of new arrivals as a growing target group should 
also be done supportively (Taavits, 2016: 10).  
Though the aim to preserve Estonian culture and language is still important, I have noticed 
that during the years the attitude towards minority population still softens. It may be 
observed even by looking through the titles of these documents. If the first  document still 
had such mark as ‘integration of non-Estonians’ in its name, then in the last document we 
may note that not even the title, but the whole document itself tries to avoid this ‘selective’ 
term. 
After regaining independence, Estonia began nation-building process, which aim was to 
restore Estonian culture and language. The European organizations found this procedure to 
be offensive for minorities and this was the reason why the first integration strategy 
appeared in 1998. Further documents were more minority-friendly, as they spoke less about 
the value of Estonian culture, but also mentioned minority issues that were also important 
for the whole society. Estonian government implemented their Integration Strategy of the 
year 2000 based on multiculturalism theory of J. Rex, though rethinking it for the needs of 
Estonian society and its own features. The latest integration program still mentions the 
basic facts from the second strategy, aiming to save Estonian language and loyalty towards 
the state, at the same time preserving cultures of all the minority groups in the state.  
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4. DATA & METHOD 
4.1 Data collection 
The research results were accomplished with the semi-structured interviews with Russian-
speaking youth and ‘mini-survey’ with the representatives of Estonian-speaking youth 
living in Estonia. Interviews and survey were conducted with the residents from Narva, 
Rapla and Tallinn. The questions were prepared beforehand, but still some additional 
questions were also asked when I wanted to broaden the interviewee’s answer.  
Overall, 20 interviews were held with the young people aged 17 to 28 years. Russian-
speaking representatives were from families with both parents speaking Russian. Two 
interviewees’ closest family members (mothers/fathers) were born in Russia, Ukraine or 
Belorussia and moved to Estonia during childhood or while young. Four interviewees’ 
parents had mixed families: one relative was born in Estonia, while another moved from 
Soviet Russia or other Soviet Russian-speaking republic. Another four interviewees’ 
closest relatives were both born in Estonia (though their grandparents still moved from 
Soviet Russia). Among this category, one interviewee even had Estonian roots, as 
grandmother was Estonian married to Russian immigrant. Until now, half of that family is 
still Estonian (aunts, sisters); though concretely interviewee’s closest relatives with each 
other speak Russian only.  
Furthermore, all the respondents had a different educational background and language-
usage experience. Five of them were studying in Estonian language while obtaining 
secondary and/or higher education. One of them even used Estonian from early childhood 
because of going to Estonian kindergarten.  All of them are still using Estonian actively as 
their place of work and collective is mainly or totally Estonian. Another five respondents 
were studying in Russian language: two of them used English later, while obtaining higher 
education and nowadays they are not using Estonian language much, as their place of work 
demands using English; another two respondents don’t use Estonian much, as they still live 
in Narva, where the majority of population consists of 95% of Russian-speaking residents 
(Pfoser, 2014: 272), though their command of Estonian is good. Another resident from 
Narva, who has recently moved to live in Tallinn, uses Estonian on her workplace most of 
the time, but at the same time, I found it more suitable to refer her to this group, as her 
basic educational background was connected with the Russian language and its usage in 
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everyday life.  
I used snowballing method to find participants for my research. Respondents were invited 
to take part in interviews via Facebook post. Seven of the interviewees were acquainted 
with me before (they were residents of Tallinn). In my post I have mentioned that I was 
searching for young people aged 17-35 from Narva and Tallinn, whose closest relatives 
were Russian-speakers. My Facebook post included brief description of my master 
degree’s theme and the theme of the future discussion.  As I had no Facebook-friends who 
lived in Narva, I asked my friends to suggest me respondents, who would be interested in 
giving an interview. I had been suggested four young people from Narva, whom I contacted 
directly. I described my intention to research young people’s view on integration policies 
in Estonia and their view on multiculturalism. Three of them responded to me that they 
agreed to take part in my research. One of the respondents did not answer, as he have not 
noticed the message.  
As to Estonian-speaking youth, I did not aim to know their roots and family background, 
considering that this was not important in this type of research. They interested me as a 
majority population and therefore I decided to concentrate my attention on the basic 
questions, concerning theory of multiculturalism and cohesion of two main nationalities. 
Furthermore, Estonians, being a majority population, mostly did not migrate or had 
immigrant parents. 
Google Forms were used as a tool to know Estonian-speakers' view on the theme. I 
distributed the link on my questionnaire among Estonian-speakers that I am acquainted 
with and whose age suited my research. I also used Facebook to contact them by using 
direct messages. I have suggested fifteen young people of different sex and age to take part 
in my research. Ten of them completed the form.  
 
4.2 Interview scheme and conduction 
Interviews were planned with the regard to study today’s youth identity and their opinion 
on the way multiculturalism policy takes place in Estonia. There were two main methods 
of collecting necessary data: via Skype and via Google Forms.  
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I have composed interview questions according to the research questions and hypothesis 
that were mentioned earlier. My questions may be conditionally divided into two main 
blocks: the first block contained questions about ethnic identity, family roots and 
background. Another block was dedicated to the discussion of multiculturalism, including 
the integration policy in Estonia. The interviewees were asked about their perception of 
multiculturalism and their opinion both on this topic and integration policies in Estonia. 
Besides, they were offered to discuss the present situation in Estonia: whether they feel that 
modern Estonian society has problems with cohesion of Russian-speakers and Estonian- 
speakers. I also wanted to know, whether young people feel any threat to their culture and 
language.  
Before the beginning of each interview, I asked respondents to be free in revealing their 
thoughts and ideas and not to be afraid of speaking. I also wanted to know their choice 
concerning anonymity when I conducted interviews via Skype. Practically all of them 
allowed me to write their name and age without surnames and one respondent decided to 
remain anonymous allowing mentioning interviewee’s sex and age. However, I decided 
just to mention sex and age of every speaker. Google Forms did not collect personal 
information such as name or surname by default. All of the respondents who gave answers 
via Google Forms also stayed anonymous.  
The data was recorded via Amolto Call Recorder program that helps to save Skype calls 
directly to the computer. The average length of the interview was approximately 45-50 
minutes. The shortest one was 33 minutes long. All the interviews with Russian-speakers 
were conducted in the Russian language; though some interviewees suggested using 
English if it was more convenient for me. However, I decided that the usage of mother 
tongue would more accurately reveal the thoughts and ideas of respondents.  
Google Forms were also relatively convenient method of gathering data: they allowed 
interviewees to write their answers in details and gave some time to think on the answers. 
In addition, I have left some space to their extra remarks and thoughts on the theme. Some 
of the respondents used this column to explain or broaden their answers with necessary 
comments. Among positive moments of working with Google Forms, I could highlight the 
convenience of this method: I did not have to transcribe my data anymore. Though Google 
Forms is faster and easier way to get data, it also had several disadvantages: once 
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respondent gave its answers, I could not trace him/her and ask to give a comment or precise 
their thoughts. The second factor may be considered as both an advantage and disadvantage: 
though respondents had time to think of their answers, they also may have tried to write 
them down more correctly, neatly choosing their words and expressions. At the same time, 
anonymity could ensure their freedom of speech. When I took oral interviewees, I had faced 
some situations, when respondents were literally taken by surprise with my questions, 
concerning, as an example, multiculturalism term. They could not think of the answer 
immediately and this situation made them worry, hesitate or feel uncomfortable. Even 
though I have told them about the multiculturalism policy and integration policies that 
Estonia adapted during the last decade, for some of them questions about multiculturalism 
were seen as intricate. However, I always tried to comfort them and convince that I was not 
in hurry and one could think on the answer as long as he/she needed.  
Furthermore, I used online versions of main Estonian newspapers to find additional 
information on the current events that are happening or have happened in the state. Political 
situation in Estonia has started to change from the end of the year 2018 - that is why it was 
interesting to follow how society shifts in terms of new circumstances. I used and analyzed 
statements of people and articles that were published in media. Usually I googled key 
words of my topic of interest. They could be used in both English, Russian and Estonian. I 
used only Estonian news portals that are famous and known as reliable ones. The main two 
were Postimees and ERR.   
 
4.3 Data analysis 
In my qualitative research, I decided to choose qualitative content analysis while working 
on results. Content analysis, according to (Cole 1988 in Elo & Kyngäs, 2007: 107) is a 
method of analyzing written, verbal and visual messages. It was at first used in the 19th 
century to analyze political agenda, but today it is used not only for these purposes, but for 
example in journalism, sociology, psychology and business, furthermore, showing stable 
growth (Neundorf, 2002 in Elo & Kyngäs, 2007: 108).  
There are several approaches while dealing with the process of analysis: deductive and 
inductive (Elo & Kyngäs, 2007: 109). Inductive content analysis is used when there is a 
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lack of knowledge or previous studies on the subject; it may also be fragmented. Deductive 
analysis, on the contrary, is preferred when the research is based on the previous studies 
and the aim of the study is theory testing (Kyngäs & Vanhanen, 1999 in Eto & Kyngas, 
2007: 109).  Preparation for the analysis also demands choosing, whether analyze only 
manifest or the latent content as well (ibid: 109): the latter involves noticing and analyze 
silence, laughter, posture and pauses, but in my situation it was not necessary, as eye-to-
eye contact was avoided.  
Deductive analysis considers one of two categorization matrixes structured in 
unconstrained. Choice depends on the aim of the study (ibid: 111): I chose the first one as 
I was interested only in those aspects, that fit the matrix of analysis. All the interviewees 
were coded, which means I had to transcribe the received data and organize it in some way. 
Codes were further transformed into categories that helped me to sort it by various themes. 
My codes connected with identity issues were taken from Soll’s (2015) research on the 
ethnic identity of Russian-speaking youth. While analyzing multiple variants that were 
identified during the analysis of received data, I decided to choose Soll’s et al. (2015) model 
of Russian-speakers’ identities. They were divided as such: secure Russian identity, 
insecure Estonian-Russian identity and alternative identity. I was asking my respondents, 
what was their ethnic identity. When they gave their answers, I wanted to know, what it 
meant for them to be Russian / Estonian-Russian or a person with alternative identity. As 
content analysis proves to be a method for analyzing documents, it also allows researchers 
to test theoretical issues to enhance understanding of the data (Elo & Kyngäs, 2007: 108).  
 
4.4 Ethics  
For more than twenty years the topic of Russophones in Baltic States had been actively 
discussed as by governments of the republics, so by European organizations and 
community. Though the development of relationships between majorities and minorities 
seems to progress, the themes of Soviet occupation for Estonians, as well as rationalization 
of USSR’s politics or Soviet lifestyle by Russian side (Pfoser, 2015), are still among acute 
ones.  
As I am also a part of Russian-speaking youth in Estonia, while conducting interviews in 
particular and during my research in generally, I needed to stay neutral and impartial while 
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discussing the topic.  
Furthermore, as some questions were hard to answer right away, I tried to neither hurry, 
nor show the interviewee that the question was simple. On the contrary, I tried to help him 
/ her sometimes with nodding, smiles and assent, so the interviewee would feel comfortable 
with its own thoughts and reasoning.  
Before the interviews, I notified participants that there were no true or false answers in our 
conversation and they may have revealed their understanding of the present issue without 
any worries of being misunderstood or accused.  
As to other aspects of ethics, data safety was also very important in my research. All the 
interviewees were asked if they wanted their thoughts to be revealed under the pseudonyms 
or if they wanted to stay completely anonymous. Practically all of them asked me to write 
down their first names only (without usage of fake names) and mention their age. However, 
one of the respondents decided to stay completely anonymous, that is why I decided, that 
there were no need to use real names or pseudonyms and later mention just sex and age. In 
addition, Google Forms did not provide me with names or any other concrete data except 
respondent’s sex and age: that is why it was more logical to do it all the same.  
In conclusion, I may also mark that there were no special cases or inconvenient situations 
from interviewer and respondents’ side. Practically all of the speakers wanted to share their 
thoughts and ideas freely and there was no fear or worries about their anonymity or about 
the accuracy / correctness of their views. Furthermore, in my opinion, many of the 
respondents seemed to sound or speak rather enthusiastically, which showed that they were 
interested in the theme and maybe even wanted to speak out.  
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5. PORTRAIT OF YOUNG GENERATION IN ESTONIA: IDENTITY AND VIEWS ON 
MULTICULTURALISM 
5.1 Russian-speaking youth’s ethnic identity 
In my research, one of the aims was to show how identity of youngsters relates to their 
views on multiculturalism: it was important to define, what identity actually was and which 
form it may take. While analyzing multiple variants that were identified during the analysis 
of received data, I decided to choose Soll’s et. al (2015) model of Russian-speakers’ 
identities. They were divided as such: secure Russian identity, insecure Estonian-Russian 
identity and alternative identity. I was asking my respondents, what was their ethnic identity. 
When they gave their answers, I wanted to know, what did it meant to them to be Russian 
/ Estonian-Russian or a person with alternative identity.  
 
5.1.1. Russian identity 
When interviewees were asked about their identity, the ones that claimed themselves to be 
Russians, indeed did not hesitate with their answer. For them it was absolutely clear that 
they were Russians. The most popular answer implied their cultural connection with their 
historical homeland. Indeed, ethnic identity is mostly based on language and culture (Küün, 
2008: 185). Their feeling of belonging to the cultural grounds was expressed as such: 
‘For me to be Russian means to speak Russian language, remember the history 
and customs, and in general, to remember my roots’. (F, 25, Tallinn)4 
The Russian language, as a key fact for construction of confident Russian identity, was 
important for the respondents as it could allow them to be closely related to Russian culture 
and literature. One of the interviewees admitted that ‘some things are known, understood 
and clear just because of the knowledge of Russian’ (F, 27, Tallinn).5 
                                                 
4 ‘Dlya menya byt’ russkoy zhachit govorit’ na russkom, pomnit svoyu istoriyu i obychai, i voobshe pomnit 
svoi korni.’  
5 ‘Nekotorye veshi ya znayui ponimayu tolko potomu, chto znayu russkiy yazyk’ 
42 
 
At the same time, not all of the respondents understood their identity as such. For them, 
knowledge of mother tongue was the main block for identity construction. Linguistic 
identity means correlation with specific language and it plays crucial role in development 
of ethnic identity.  Linguistic communication is also important as through this mean people 
learn new facts, ideas and thoughts. Researchers claim that the ethnic identity of non-
Estonians depends on their command of Estonian language and the regularity of 
communicating on official language (Rannut, 2005 in Küün, 2008: 186). However, my 
interviews showed that this is not always a case and people who frequently communicate 
with Estonians and speak Estonian language fluently  may also strongly identify themselves 
with their mother tongue.  
‘I went to Estonian kindergarten and school <…>. My parents once got terrified 
when I came back home from kindergarten and spoke Estonian only, sang 
Estonian songs etc. However, I definitely feel myself Russian, it’s no doubt about 
that. But for me being Russian, does not mean anything, I feel myself Russian 
only because of the language knowledge’. (F, 26, Tallinn)6 
One of the most interesting answers concerning Russian identity was connected not only 
with a cultural relation to the state, but also with an ethnic pride of being a Russian.  
‘For me being Russian means to be myself. I was born like that and I do not regret 
about that. There are things on Earth that only Russians can understand and I am 
very happy to be Russian’. (F, 25, Tallinn)7 
However, ethnic pride did not evaluate later, when our talk was continued about relations 
between Estonians and Russians/Russian-speakers. It was not mentioned as superiority 
over some culture or act of nationalism, but rather as love for language and Russian 
mentality or mindset. 
Cheskin (2015: 79) admits that situation in Baltic States may be described as a ‘memory 
                                                 
6 ‘Ya khodila v estonskiy detskiy sadik I shkolu <…>. Kak-to raz ya prishla iz detskogo sadika i moi roditeli 
uzhasnulis’ ot togo, chto ya govorju tolko po-estonski, poju estonskie pesni itd. Tem ne menee, ya vse ravno 
schitayu sebya russkoj, v etom net somnenia. No dlya menya byt russkoy nichego ne znachit. Ya russkaya 
tolko potomu, chto znayu etot yazyk.’ 
7 ‘Dlya menya byt russkoy znachit byt soboy. Ya takoy rodilas’ i ya ob etom ne zhaleyu. Na Zemle est’ stolko 
vsego, chto mogut ponjat’ tolko russkie, i ya rada byt’ russkoy.’ 
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war’, which implies different interpretation of XX century’s history. Russian-speakers 
mostly deny the fact that Estonia was occupied by Soviet Union and tend to associate Soviet 
invasion with positive sides, such as the creation of industry, job security, free medicine 
and education. Cheskin also suggests that Russia still plays vital role in forming identity in 
Estonia and Latvia. Consumption of Russian media and adoption of political memory 
narratives make Russophones feel close cultural connections with Russian state.  
However, I suppose that this view is mostly true for older generations. It is no secret that 
Russian Federation may still influence on Russian-speakers in the Baltics, but at the same 
young people are more mobile in their mindsets: they scoop their knowledge from Internet 
and in general have more access to independent resources and media, unlike their parents 
and grandparents, who are accustomed to believe TV broadcast. This may also be true for 
Estonian-speakers. Some of the representatives from majority population still remember 
the occupation years.  
 
5.1.2. Insecure Estonian-Russian identity 
Valk et al. (2011: 37) mentioned Tajfel’s (1981) social identity theory which suggests that 
people who do not want to be associated with negatively valued group or that are 
discriminated, give up one’s ethnic identity. This may happen, when person’s original 
identification was not strong.  
Approximately half of the respondents were not sure about their identity or found it hard 
to give a precise answer. The answers were also different and while some people correlated 
their mixed identity with good knowledge of both languages and plans to reside in Estonia 
in the future, others related themselves to the European lifestyle and different mentality 
from Russians in Russia. They mention some kind of  ‘Europeanness’ that separates them.  
EU as a globalized structure also influences the identity formation of young people in 
Estonia.  
‘I cannot totally relate myself to Russian, because part of my family is Estonian, 
I was born in Estonia and though we all were raised on the First Channel (Perviy 
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Kanal)8 we have a different mindset with Russians, in my opinion. I can say that 
I am someone in between, as for example when I watch sport or musical 
competitions I always cheer for both Estonians and Russians. That’s why I am 
someone in the middle’. (F, 25, Tallinn)9 
Sense of belonging to a certain culture does not always play a vital role in formulating and 
ethnic identity. Some of the respondents noticed that the Russian part of the word 
‘Estonian-Russian’ in this case means cultural relation to the Russia, but at the same time 
this cultural construct did not form a strong sense of belonging to Russian nationality. 
Furthermore, for someone it was mostly connected with European mentality, rather than 
Estonian. 
‘In my family it was always important to preserve Russian culture, <...>, but as I 
was also raised on American cartoons and TV channels and Western culture was 
also close to me. I think it more quickly spread in Estonia, than in Russia.  I feel 
that I have some mixed mentality and many people in Estonia [Russian-speakers] 
do have it, too. I may say that this is a half Russian-half European mindset’ (F, 24, 
Tallinn)10 
Kirch (2004: 20) also mentioned a new type of identity that eventually will be on the first 
place and that is a Euro-Russian identity.  
It is worth noticing that while some of the respondents have a strong Russian identity that 
refers to the mother tongue then others do not highlight this feature as a dominant one in 
                                                 
8 The First Channel is the most popular news and entertaining TV channel in Russia. In Baltic States, such as 
Estonia and Latvia it is also quite popular among Russian-speaking community, though in Lithuania it has 
already been blocked for information distortion about January events in Lithuania in the year 1991 
(https://www.calvertjournal.com/news/show/3526/lithuania-demands-two-russian-tv-channels-to-admit-
biased-broadcasting). 
9 ‘Ya ne mogu sebya polnostyu otnesti k russkoy, tak kak chast’ moei semyi – estoncy, ya rodilas’ v Estonii, 
i hotya my vse rosli na Pervom Kanale, u nas raznye, po-moemu, obrazy myshleniya s russkimi. Ya mogu 
skazat’, chto ya kto-to poseredine. Ya, naprimer, kogda idut kakie-to muzykalnye ili sportivnye sostyazaniya, 
vsegda boleyu i za russkih, i za estoncev.’ 
10  V moey semje vsegda bylo vazhno sokhranyat’ russkuyu kulturu <…>, no ya takzhe rosla na 
amerikanskikh multikakh i kanalakh, poetomu zapadnaya kultura mne tozhe ochen’ blizka. Ya dumayu ona 
bystree rasprostranilas’ zdes’, chem v Rossii. Ya dumayu, chto u menya smeshanniy mentalitet i u mnogih 
drugih ljudej v Estonii tozhe tak. Ya dumayu, chto eto kakoy-to polurusskij, poluevropejskiy mentalitet.’ 
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identity construction. Still, linguistic background often plays vital role in forming identity, 
when only language completes the ‘Russian’ part of ethnic identity.  
‘I am in such a geopolitical position, when both Russia and Estonia are very close 
to me. But <…> Estonia and the European lifestyle is closer to me. ‘Russian’ in 
me is only language, that is my mother tongue, but besides that, there is nothing 
more. (M, 28, Narva) 11 
The case of Narva is also an interesting one, as this region is historically formed as 
predominantly Russian-speaking region with a small motivation in learning Estonian 
language. In the year 1993, the law on Cultural Autonomy was accepted that allowed 
regions with high density of minority population to use their language in clerical work. In 
this situation, Narva was believed to be ‘marginalized’ region due to its close location to 
Russian Federation and relatively poor knowledge of official language. However, as my 
interviews and latest research shows, Russian-speaking youth in Narva is highly motivated 
to learn Estonian. Furthermore, practically all humanitarian subjects in school are taught in 
Estonian; this approach allows students to have language practice, which is important for 
language learning process.  
The plans to connect future life with this country are also may be distinguished as a part of 
identity construct.  
‘I identify myself with someone in the middle. I know Russian, I also know 
Estonian, but I am planning to stay here in the future, to study at the University in 
here’. (F, 17, Narva)12 
Russian-speaking youth in Narva defines population of Ida-Virumaa13 as opposite to the 
population that resides in Western parts of Estonia. Some of them while comparing Narva 
and Tallinn shared thoughts that the streets in Tallinn were more beautiful, clean, quiet and 
well groomed, lifestyle is also more exciting. When I asked their opinion on the reason 
                                                 
11 Ya v takoy geopoliticheskoy situacii, chto i Estoniya, I Rossiya odinakovo blizki dlya menya. No <…>  
Evropejskiy obraz zhizni dlya menya blizhe. Russkogo vo mne – tolko moi rodnoy yazyk, nichego bolshe.’ 
12 ‘Ya identificiruyu sebya s kem-to pseredine. Ya znayu russkiy, ya takzhe znayu estonskiy, no ya planiruyu 
tut ostavatsya i uchitsya v universitete.’ 
13 A county in Estonia which lies near the Russian border with Narva in its center 
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why such situation takes place in their region, they pointed to the fact that ‘Russian 
mentality’ prevails in Ida-Virumaa, which makes people lazy and noisy in lots of aspects.  
 ‘I think Russians in Estonia, especially in Narva have this kind of settled way of 
life, all they want to do is to complain. Estonians, at least the ones I knew and 
worked with, are very hard-working, it can be said that they are obsessed with 
their work’. (M, 28, Narva)14 
While comparing Estonian youth with Russian-speaking youth, the most popular answer 
was that Estonians are very reserved even in contrast with Estonian-Russians. Russian-
speakers characterized themselves as open-minded, sincere and openhearted people. 
Estonians were at the same time described as ‘good people’ but too reserved and calm. It 
was also mentioned that it takes time to get to know Estonian person well, while Russian-
speakers ‘may become real friends from the first day of acquaintance’. It was also 
mentioned that Estonians are very good as colleagues as they do not try to enter your 
personal life and they are not that interested in it, as Russians.  
This paragraph may be concluded with the idea, that more and more young people in 
Estonia are obtaining this mixed type of identity. This fact was already mentioned by a 
large amount of researchers (Kirch, 2004; Fiškina, 2000). They argued that the new type of 
Russians emerges that is not already similar not only to Russians in Russia, but for example, 
Russians in America, too. As Kirch notices: young people are becoming multicultural, and 
if they will preserve their language, culture and ethnic identity, they will still no longer be 
identical to the Russian youth in Russian Federation (2004: 18). These changes in identity 
formation may be seen both as positive and negative: from the one hand, it is association 
with a globalized world, Europe, in particular. At the same time it may be described as 
assimilation process and a fear of being related to ‘negative others’.  
 
                                                 
14 ‘Ya dumayu, chto russkie v Estonii, osobenno v Narve, u nih takoy osedliy obraz zhizni: vsyo, chto oni 
hotyat delat’ – eto zhalovatsya. Estoncy, po krainey mere te, kogo ya znayu i s kotorymi rabotal, - ochen’ 
trudolyubivye. Mozhno dazhe skazat’, chto oni pomeshany na svoey rabote’.  
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5.1.3. Alternative identity 
Though language construct is often the main one in identity formation, it is not always a 
case. Sometimes motherland which was left many years ago may also be a ‘brick’ in ethnic 
identity construction. One of the respondents was born in Belorussia and left its homeland 
in early childhood. Though interviewee’s mother tongue is Russian and it admits that in 
Belorussia practically everyone uses Russian in daily life that is what it explained:  
‘It’s a good question! I definitely do not relate myself to Estonians… I am from 
Belorussia, so yes, I mostly refer myself to this country. I practically forgot 
Belorussian language, but it is ok, few people speak Belorussian in there. I have 
Russian roots, but I was raised in Belorussia, so I suppose my ethnic identity is 
Belorussian’. (F, 25, Tallinn)15 
In conclusion it may be said that for both ‘Russians’ and ‘Estonian-Russians’ the main 
feature of their ethnic identity was language in both cases. It was often the only aspect by 
which ‘Russian’ concept was formulated. However, interviews showed that language is not 
always the main part of identity construction and alternative identities may ‘wake up’ as a 
memory of homeland, for example.  
 
5.2 Estonian ethnic identity 
When Estonian-speaking youth gave its answers concerning ethnic identity, I was surprised 
with how different they were from Russian-speaking side. I have admitted that for most of 
them, ethnic identity was closely related to the civic one. Vihalemm (2018: 486) argued 
that both Estonians and Russians with strong belonging to the Western socio-cultural space 
have this strong civic solidarity, which means that people value their citizenship, co-
existence as citizens or civic rights. However, during my interviewees with Russian-
speaking population, no one, surprisingly, mentioned these factors. When I asked Estonians 
about their ethnic identity and what it meant for them to be Estonian, they formulated their 
                                                 
15‘Eto khoroshiy vopros! Ya tochno ne prichislyayu sebya k estoncam… Ya iz Belorussii, tak chto da, ya 
skoree vsego prichislyayu sebya k etoy strane. Ya prakticheski zabyla belorusskij yazyk, no v etom net 
nichego takogo, malo kto tam govorit  na belorusskom. U menya est’ russkie korni, no ya rosla v Belorussii, 
tak chto ya polagayu, chto moya etnicheskaya identichnost – belorusska.’ 
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answers as such: 
‘It means to live in Estonia, where according to the constitution I have civil rights’ 
(F, 23, Tallinn)16.  
In addition, nationality, together with citizenship was also mentioned as an ethnic identity 
concept. It may be interesting to compare Estonians with Russians or Estonian-Russians in 
this case, because nationality was practically not mentioned by the latter. They may have 
called it as ‘roots’ or ‘cultural heritage’ but the word ‘nationality’ was mentioned only once, 
concerning ethnic identity concept. Estonians, on the contrary, did not hesitate to use this 
word to describe their belonging to Estonian nation.  
My research did not aim to represent civic identity of both ethnical groups, though some 
thoughts concerning citizenship rights were mentioned between both sides. If Estonians 
connected their ethnicity with citizenship and civil rights, Russian-speaking youth was 
mostly denying their interest in civic activities, such as elections. One of the respondents 
who had zero-citizenship claimed that it would participate in elections if she had an 
Estonian citizenship (F, 26, Tallinn)17, though zero-citizenship allows participation at least 
on the local level. Some of the interviewees stated that they were not interested in the 
elections and they had never taken part in it. One of the Russophones stated that she did 
not know what the aim of the elections was and she participated in them only because her 
sister made her do it. Generally, she did not see any point in doing this, as in her words: 
‘everything remained the same’, whichever party came to power in Estonia. Furthermore, 
she was not interested in their election program at all. Besides, she was skeptical about the 
work of parliament – in her words, politics often have a lot of promises before the elections, 
but they never keep them (F, 24, Tallinn)18.  
I must not draw a conclusion on these facts, especially in the situation, when Estonians’ 
view on governmental elections is not clear, but it seems to me that Estonians are more 
                                                 
16 Tähendab elada Eestis, kus mul on põhiseadusest tulenevad kodanikuõigused 
17 Ya by hodila na vybory, esli by u menya bylo estonskoe grazhdanstvo, no tak kak ya ego ne imeyu, ya v 
nih ne uchastvuju.  
18  Mne kazhetsya, chto vybory nichego ne menyaut: byla odna partiya u vlasti – teper drugaya, v 
politicheskom smysle nichego ne menyaetsya <…> Ya hozhu na vybory, potomu chto sestra zastvljaet 
(laughs). Ya ne osobo znakoma s programmami partiy, a predvybornye obeshaniya nikto ne vypolnayet. 
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aware of their rights and responsibilities, than Russian-speakers are.  
‘For me being Estonian means that I was born in Estonia, my mother tongue is 
Estonian, I know Estonian history and culture, adhere to the laws, celebrate 
holidays (birthday, Christmas, New Year’s eve etc.) as other Estonians’. 19 (F, 19, 
Tallinn) 
Some of Estonian-speakers also mentioned language and cultural heritage as the basis for 
ethnic identity construction. However, if we could create a notional tag cloud, the most 
popular keywords for Estonian-speaking youth that would describe their identity would be 
connected with such words as ‘nation’, ‘state’, ‘homeland’, ‘civil rights’.  
It seems that identity construction is indeed a very complicated concept as the question 
‘who you are?’ is personal one. It combines many of self-consciousness’ aspects that 
influence the decision. Anyway, some basic trends may be traced in studying ethnic identity 
of certain nations or populations.  
 
5.3. Russian-speaking youth’s view on multiculturalism and Estonian government’s 
steps towards integration.  
Practically for every respondent multiculturalism was seen as such state structure in which 
many different cultures co-exist together peacefully. Every culture has its own habits and 
cultural practices, costumes, food and other forms of diversity, but one of the cultures does 
not disturb another culture, they respect each other and do not try to compete which culture 
is the best one and which is the most important one.  
One of the respondents marked that multiculturalism is a very good method in dealing with 
various cultures and that society should be opened for everyone. Concerns that too cautious 
attitude towards one’s culture may lead to nationalistic ideas also came out. 
Multiculturalism was seen as something progressive and Canada was mentioned as the best 
way of treating minorities and various cultures. 
‘For me, Canada is the best variant of treating minority cultures. Their motto is 
                                                 
19 Minu jaoks see tähendab seda, et ma olen sündinud Eestis, ma räägin eesti keelt, tean Eesti ajaloost, 
kultuurist, pean kinni seadustest, tähistan tähtpäevi (sünnipäev, jõulud, vana-aasta jne) nagu teised eestlased. 
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not to close their own country for everyone, but to open it for everyone. They say 
that diversity is good and ‘we are glad to welcome different cultures’. I think that 
this is multiculturalism.  (F, 25, Tallinn)20 
For some of the respondents multiculturalism was seen as a threat or an encroachment on 
other cultures’. In fact, in most of the cases Western society was imagined with an 
enormous variety of cultures, religions, races and nationalities. I have not given any 
specific explanations on this term as I wanted to study what multiculturalism actually is for 
young people.  
It is good when cultures are respected and are given freedom, but at the same time 
I think there should be no total freedom for everyone. For example, I don’t like 
the hijabs; I may think that there is a bomb under the clothing, why should I allow 
such thing in my country?’ (F, 25, Tallinn)21 
Though multiculturalism was mostly seen as a positive tendency and appropriate for social 
stability, opinions divided when I asked whether such policy is suitable for Estonian 
Republic. Some of the interviewees saw this step as good one, as it could help Estonians 
and Russian-speakers to co-exist together in a peaceful way, in terms that, as everyone still 
lives in Estonian state, national language has to be learned, though not so much attention 
should be directed to this issue and the loyalty to the state should also be preserved. The 
ones that insisted on failure of the multiculturalism policy to take roots in Estonia were 
saying that Estonia is too small and it culture should be elevated. The idea of two official 
languages in one state was welcomed by the first group, while in the second one 
respondents were not sure that this step is right, though this idea sounded tempting. Two 
official languages were seen as a threat for Estonians to preserve their culture and traditions, 
as for Russians-speakers there would be no motivation at all to learn the Estonian language. 
In general, all of the respondents admitted that in more or less degree Estonian culture 
should be saved. Furthermore, it was mentioned that two official languages could separate 
                                                 
20 Dlya menya Kanada – eto luchshiy primer togo, kak obraschyutsya s menshinstvami. Ih deviz – ne zakryt 
stranu dlya vseh, a otkryt dlya vseh. Oni govoryat o tom, chto raznoobrazie – eto horosho i chto ’my rady 
privetstvovat raznye kultury’. Ya dumayu, chto eto i est’ multikulturalizm.  
21 Ya dumayu, chto eto zdorovo, kogda kultury uvazhayutsya i im predostavlyayutsya svobody, no v to zhe 
vremya ya ne dumayu, chto svoboda dolzhna predostvljatsya vsem. Naprimer, mne ne nravyatsya hidzhaby, 
ya dumayu, chto pod nimi mozhet byt’ bomba: pochemu ya dolzhna razreshat takie veshi v svoey strane? 
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the society even more.      
‘I am not a racist or someone like that, but I wouldn’t like Estonia to be as Sweden, 
for example. I was there and I did not like the amount of immigrants. I did not feel 
safe. Estonia is so small, I think all the people will mix and there will be no 
Estonians in the future. (F, 26, Tallinn)22 
It was necessary for me to understand the attitude towards integration steps of Estonian 
government as its integrational program was built on the basis of multiculturalism, adapted 
for Estonia’s needs.  As it was mentioned earlier in the third chapter of my thesis, Estonia 
has accepted the policy of multiculturalism marked with the necessity of speaking one 
national language and with the loyalty to the state. That is why I proceeded asking 
respondents about their attitude towards the language policy. 
All of the respondents understood integration as a policy that helps minorities to get 
involved into Estonian society. It was necessary for uniting different cultures and 
nationalities into one society. For them, governmental steps in integrating consist of 
linguistic changes during the secondary education and a requirement for official language’s 
high command in general. All of these measures were mostly rated as ‘helpful’ and ‘useful’, 
though some reservations still appeared. 
‘Of course these measures are good, but at the same time I think it would be better 
if education would not be totally transformed into Estonian, but rather included 
more hours of Estonian language at school, maybe even some excursions or events, 
organized together with Estonian schools. These steps would lead to the ‘live’ 
experience and would be more helpful in learning Estonian, without any harm to 
understanding material that is learnt in another language.’ (F, 25, Tallinn) 
It was already said that for Russian-speaking youth in Estonia it is not a problem to learn 
Estonian and to speak it well. They are motivated enough for these steps even if they do 
not plan to stay in Estonia forever. They all admit that Estonian culture should be valued 
and Estonians are seen as culture bearers that do not wish their culture to disappear. I 
suppose that young generations are more flexible unlike their parents that in the majority 
had this strong Soviet identity. This identity assumed the existence of lots of cultures and 
                                                 
22 Ya ne rassistka ili tipa togo, no ya by ne hotela, chtoby Estonia stala kak Shvecija, naprimer. Ya tam byla i 
mne ne ponravilosj kolichestvo immigrantov. Ya ne chuvstvovala sebya v bezopasnosti. Estonia takaya 
malenkaya, ya dumayu, chto vse lyudi smeshayutsya i ne budet nikakih estoncev v budushem. 
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nationalities that lived under the one united Soviet State, but at the same time Soviet 
Republics’ population, whose mother tongue was not Russian, should have learned Russian 
too. The approach was different, as the Soviet Union represented fifteen different republics 
with very diverse cultures that shared one country. I think that this concept made them feel 
disappointed when nation-building took place after the collapse of the USSR, they often 
compared  the Soviet times to modern reality and some scholars described this phenomenon 
in their works (Fein, 2015).  
However, one group of respondents feel that there may be some broadening of the minority 
rights for cultural freedom allowed, while the second group states that everything is fine 
with integration steps and there is no problem with cultural preservation. For them, if 
Russian-speakers aim to give their children ideas of Russian culture, then they will do it 
without any obstacles. The fact that historically happened to Russians who turned out to 
get into totally new state, is seen as a given and nothing can be done in this case. They 
suppose that Russian-speakers should adapt to the situation and try to integrate into 
Estonian society. This would help two nations to live peacefully. 
‘I would like the pace of integration to speed up and I would like society to be 
more close-knit. I see how people, even immigrants try to learn Estonian language 
and I think that is normal for person who lives in a foreign land. The more courses, 
programs will be made for learning Estonian, the better it would be for the society 
as a whole.  On the other hand, I admire the examples of those countries, in which 
there are two official languages. This situation does not isolate nations. However, 
I would like to hear less argues about integration issue: if for someone learning 
Estonian is too hard, one may try to find a more comfortable place to live.’ (F, 27, 
Tallinn)23 
 
                                                 
23 ‘Ya by hotela, chtoby tempy integracii uskorilis’ i chtoby obshestvo bylo bolee splochennym. I vizhu kak 
ljudi, dazhe immigranty, pytajutsya uchit’ estonskiy yazyk i ya dumayu, chto eto absoljutno normaljno dlja 
cheloveka, kotoriy zhivet v drugoj strane. Chem bolshe kursov, program budet sozdano dlya izucheniya 
estonskogo, tem luchshe eto budet dlya obshestva v tselom. S drugoy storony, mne nravitsya opyt teh stran, 
gde dva officialnyh yazyka. Eta situaciya ne razdelyaet nacii. Tem ne menee, ya by hotela slyshat menshe 
sporov ob integracii: esli komu-to tak slozhno vyuchit estonskiy, mozhno poprobovat naity bolee komfortnoe 
mesto dlya zhizni’. 
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5.4. Perception of multiculturalism and integration policies from Estonian-speakers’ 
view.  
Estonian-speakers practically unanimously described multiculturalism as a situation, where 
two or more different cultures co-exist in one state peacefully and reckon with this.   
‘Multiculturalism is, in my opinion, means to live in one area with people from 
different cultural backgrounds and taking it into account’. (F, 23, Rapla)24 
One of the interviewees described multiculturalism through some kind of mixed identity: 
‘For me, multiculturalism is when parents are, for example, Americans but they 
live in Estonia and their child was born in Estonia and he speaks both languages, 
celebrates both  holidays and  anniversaries etc.’ (F, Rakvere, 17)25 
Overwhelming majority of respondents appreciated multiculturalism and described it 
as ’positive’ tendency, while two of ten young people have stated that this policy has 
negative connotations. For them, as for certain Russian-speakers, multiculturalism was 
seen as a threat to Estonian culture and language.  
‘I don’t see anything good in multicultural states - national identity disappears.’ 
(F, Tallinn, 23)26 
However, according to opinions of the Estonian young people, concerns about loss of 
national and cultural identity were identified among all the respondents. As it was 
mentioned above, mostly all of them suggested that the multiculturalism is no harm for the 
Estonian Republic and that multiculturalism indeed exists as a policy. At the same time, 
they highlighted main worries about the future of the Estonian language, national and 
cultural identity:  
‘Many people get out of here and English, which has become one of the main 
languages in the world and which majority speaks, is becoming popular among 
Estonians too, for example while communicating with friends’. 27 
                                                 
24 ‘Mitmekultuurilisus minu jaoks tähendab elada ühel pinnal mitme erineva kultuurilise taustaga inimesega 
ning arvestada seda’. 
25 Minu arvates on mitmekultuurilisus see, kui vanemad on nt ameeriklased, aga nad elavad Eestis ja laps on 
ise sündinud Eestis ja räägib mõlemat keelt, tähistab mõlemi riigi tähtpäevi/pühasid jne. 
26 Ei näe midagi positiivset multikultuursetes riikides, kaob ära rahvuslik omapära 
27 Paljud lähevad siit ära ja ka mingil määral inglise keel, mis on saanud maailmas üheks põhikeeleks, mida 
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The Estonian young people divided their attitudes towards multiculturalism in two different 
matters: the first one was mostly connected with the issue of Russian-speaking population, 
and the second one was associated with the migrants’ flow after the Syrian crisis.  
If speaking about the latter, according to the EU’s plans from the year 2015, Estonia had 
to shelter about 300 migrants from Turkey, Iraq and Syria (ERR, 27.12.2018). 28  As 
reported in the survey, which was conducted by Aivar Voog in 2016, the opinion of 
Estonia’s residents about refugees’ migration has changed and improved significantly 
during the years 2015-2016. The percentage of Estonian-speakers in the survey comprised 
of 76% against 24% of Russian-speakers. If in 2015 43% of people have stated that they 
were in favor of accepting those in need, then in 2016 this amount has increased to the level 
of 56%. Still, 30% of residents were extremely critical about giving shelter to migrants. 
However, in 2015, this number was about 40%.  At the same time, nothing has changed 
during these years if we take to account the attitude towards refugees: 90% still argued that 
the newcomers should work and pay taxes. Furthermore, they should accept Estonian 
cultural norms, have knowledge of national language and respect local legislation. In 
addition, respondents stated that only those, who are victims of war and persecution, should 
be allowed to enter, while those who are in search of an easy life should not be accepted. 
According to Voog, 26% of respondents think that refugees should not get any financial 
help from the government at all (this percentage has also decreased from 34% in 2015) 
(Voog, 2016: 16). In Voog’s survey we may also follow that the social background of the 
respondents also influences the results: age, education and nationality highlighted some of 
the key facts about attitude towards the issue. He adds that people with higher education 
tend to be more tolerant and feel less threat from the migrants. What is more important is 
that non-Estonians were more positive about giving shelter to refugees, but at the same 
time they were more likely to feel unsecure, comparing to Estonian-speakers (Voog, 2016: 
19). Young people from 15 to 34, according to Voog’s survey, are also more tolerant and 
positive about sheltering those in need.  In contrast to the older generations, they marked 
that ‘people with different cultural background enrich Estonian life’. They also agreed that 
                                                 
enamik räägib, see hakkab aina rohkem ka eestlaste suhu jääma ka sõpradega suheldes, näiteks. 
28  Eesti Rahvusringhääling https://news.err.ee/887732/no-eu-migrant-plan-refugees-arrive-in-estonia-in-
2018  
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‘we need to help other countries with refugees, if we want other countries to help us’ (Voog, 
2016: 12).  
In my opinion, Estonian-speaking young people tended to divide the issue of Russophones 
and migrants from different parts of the world. Most of the examples were brought with 
the cases of newcomers from Asia and Near East. According to their responses, migrants 
should adjust to the Estonian lifestyle, national language and culture and not to ‘play by 
their rules’. Voog’s survey (2016: 15) has also shown that young people, as well as adults 
and older generations support this statement practically unanimously. Besides, 
integrational problems were also applied more to today’s migrants.  
As long as nobody tries to forcefully fool you around with one’s religion or 
culture – everything is ok. I think that national language is national language and 
despite that you are Estonian, Russian, Korean etc., you need to know national 
language if you live here or try your best to speak it (F, 22, Tallinn). 29 
Though Russian-speakers may be seen as ‘natives’ in Estonia, according to the given 
responds, all of the interviewees admitted that Russophones and Estonians are not still 
close-knit. However, some of them marked that the situation improves.  
‘Rather no [not close-knit], because often Estonians and Russians are not seen 
as equal’.30 (F, 17, Rakvere) 
‘To some extent… younger generations are partially merged: more, than older 
ones’.31 (F, 23,Tallinn) 
The answers were mostly negative, which means that Estonian-speaking youth sees 
Russophones and native Estonians as two different societies that live together in one land.  
Opinions were similar, when I asked interviewees about their attitude towards national 
integration program and their suggestions on it. Young people noticed that problems do 
exist: 
I think that there are [problems with integration of minorities]. In schools dark-
skinned people or people from other cultures are rather quickly excluded (F, 17, 
                                                 
29 Mina arvan, et riigikeel on riigikeel ning olenemata kas sa oled eestlane, venelane, korealane jne pead sa 
riigis elades oskama riigikeelt või andma endast parima, et seda osata. 
30 Ma arvan, et pigem mitte, sest tihti ei võeta eestlasi ja venelasi võrdsetena 
31 Mingil määral jah, kaks rahvust on osaliselt kokku sulandunud, rohkem noorem generatsioon kui vanem. 
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Rakvere). 32 
They still insisted that the knowledge of the Estonian language is very important and as it 
was mentioned earlier, there is an abyss between two different cultures that exist in Estonia. 
The reason was seen in distinct cultural backgrounds, mother tongue and delimiting of two 
nationalities. However, some of the respondents were positive on their view on integration 
as it is and suggested that the language issue could improve the situation.  
‘Integrating nation must take into account the specificities of the new state and 
be prepared to learn the culture and language’. (F, 23, Rapla)33 
 
5.5. The problem of division  
Indeed, the division of two nationalities has been rather popular theme for years. The first 
big incident that happened in 2007 has shown that there still was a split between Estonian- 
and Russian-speakers even after 16 years after restoration of independence have passed.  
For Russian-speakers in Estonia, World War II has always been a symbol of victorious 
struggle of the Soviet Russia against Nazi Germany’s invaders: sufferings that brought this 
struggle have touched almost every family. As it was mentioned earlier in the introduction, 
Estonians and Russians have always had different view on historical events, which took 
place in XX century. For most of Russian-speakers, as David Smith (2008: 421) mentions 
in his article, the arrival of Soviet troops into the Baltics was not seen as an occupation, but 
rather as a part of liberation from Nazism. However, Estonians have seen this act as 
violence and illegal invasion.  
The Bronze Soldier, as a monument of freedom for one side and a symbol of occupation 
from the other, did not attract attention and was mostly ignored by the public, having 
changed its name from ‘Monument to Liberators of Tallinn’ to the ‘Fallen of World War II’, 
despite the fact that all the other symbols of Soviet-era were quickly removed after the 
restoration of independence (Smith, 2008: 422). However, when in late April 2007 the 
Bronze Soldier was replaced from the center of the town to the remote Military Cemetery, 
                                                 
32  Ma arvan, et on, sest koolides tõrjutakse suhteliselt kiiresti välja tumedanahalised või teistsugusest 
kultuurist inimesed. 
33 Intergreeruv rahvas peab arvestama uue riigi eripäraga ning olema ise valmis õppima kultuuri ning keelt 
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the reaction, which followed this incident, has shown that the society in Estonia was still 
polarized and still had old scars, which did not disappear by themselves after 1992. Massive 
demonstrations and nights of violence which happened as a reaction to the replacement of 
the Bronze Soldier from Russian-speakers’ side have demonstrated that there are still 
challenges of ‘multicultural integration’ (Smith, 2008: 426).  
In January 2019, another loud case has reminded that the Estonian society was once again 
jolted by the unsuccessful advertisement in the capital’s center.  The inscription of an ad 
divided a tram stop into two different parts and marked one side to be ‘only for Russians’ 
and the second one ‘only for Estonians’. Furthermore, it was suggested to the viewer to 
think carefully and chose ‘the right side’. The controversial ad has made a lot of noise not 
only among citizens, but also among the governmental circles. Responsible for the 
advertisement appeared to be a liberal Estonian political party, which was founded in 
November, 2018 (Delfi, 3.11.2018).34 The chairwoman of ‘Estonia 200’ party commented 
the advertisement as such: ‘We promised you that we would talk honestly about things, 
and talk about the real issues that Estonian society is facing. Yesterday we highlighted a 
very important and sore issue that has gone unresolved for 28 years. Division is a very 
serious problem facing Estonian society’ (ERR, 08.01.2019). 35  Kristina Kallas, the 
chairman of ‘Estonia 200’, has also stated that the society was divided because children 
went to different schools, Estonians and Russians watched different TV channels, worked 
at separate places, lived at separate city districts and that people even rang to each other on 
the New Year’s Eve at two different times.36 She saw the solution in improvement of 
educational system, which meant that the language of education should be changed to 
Estonian. The advertisement was replaced in 24 hours after it was installed.  
 
                                                 
34 http://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/blogi-ja-fotod-eesti-200-moodustas-partei-erakonna-
esimeheks-valiti-kristina-kallas?id=84215823  
35 https://news.err.ee/895959/kristina-kallas-our-ads-drew-attention-to-existing-issue  
36  Russian-speakers often celebrate the New Year not only according to Estonia’s timezone, but also 
according to Moscow’s. 
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5.6. National or native language: which one suits the most?  
As it was mentioned earlier in the third chapter of the thesis, language issue was always 
important for Estonia: it was seen as a solution for uniting people of different cultures, 
mostly Russian-speakers and Estonians, and help former to integrate into the Estonian 
society. However, Russian-speaking community mostly did not support the idea of total 
transition of education from Russian to Estonian language. It was argued that Estonian-
based education may lead to problems with self-identification among younger genereations 
and their assimilation in the future (Baltnews, 25.02.2019). 37 Some believe that minorities 
should have an equal opportunity to study in their language, as it would mean identical 
opportunities for everyone. At the same time, paradigm of nationalism suggests that 
emphasis should be made on national language and on the development of sense of loyalty 
(Soll, 2015: 18). However, the number of families, who preferred Estonian-medium 
schools and kindergartens to Russian-medium, have increased from 17% in 2005 to 23% 
in 2013 (Staistics Estonia 2015 in Soll, 2015: 18). The number of pupils in schools with 
Russian has also decreased due to new option – language immersion classes.   
Postimees (17.07.2013)38 has published several opinions of parents, who decided to place 
their children in kindergartens with Estonian language. They were mostly positive, as their  
experience with siwtching background to bilingual was rather effective: 
’My second child is already attenidng Estonian kindergarten, and the first one 
has succesfully got to an Estonain school. I can’t say that everything likethis 
would have happened if there were Russian kindergartens and schools nearby, 
but I don’t want to regret about it. <....>In order to speak mother tongue, you 
need to read a lot of literature, which is helpful for any language, or to live in 
Russia. Estonian should be known here, deaspite your attitutude towards 
Estonians.’ (Sergey) 
’Our child went to Estonian kindergaten at the age of four. Everything was fine 
with native language. Two months later our child began to use Estonian in his 
speech, however making mistakes and using nominative case. After six months, 
he alrady speaks mostly correctly, inderstand everything <...>. He has no accent 
<...>. We are very satisfied. In a group with several Russian children, they play 
with each other only in their free time <....>. (Anonymous parent). 
                                                 
37 https://m.baltnews.ee/tallinn_news/20190225/1017442370/centrist-o-slovah-kalyulaid.html  
38 https://rus.postimees.ee/1302922/chitatel-ne-boytes-otdavayte-svoego-rebenka-v-estonskiy-detskiy-sad 
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The Reform Party, which has got majority of seats after Parliamental elections in March 
2019 (though did not succeeded in forming government), announced that one of the main 
goals of their election program still remained the same – to make schools and kindergartens 
in Estonia joint for children from different cultural and ethnic backgrounds. Language of 
instructure is therefore should have been Estonian only (Postimees, 28.08.2018). 39 
Riigikogu has also discussed this issue and most of the parliamentaries agreed that Estonia 
is moving towards united educational system for both Russian- and Estonian-speakers, but 
it would take time to implement these radical changes. Member of the Parliament from Pro 
Patria polictial party, Viktoria Ladõnskaja-Kubits, has stated that: ’Russians in Estonia 
must be given a feeling of confidence that even in Estonian school the child will not lose 
its identity, and will not become alienated from its mother and father and its ancestral 
roots’(ERR, 14.09.2018)40.  
Though the theme is being actively discussed throughout the years, it is still not clear if 
these measures are suitable enough for Estonian society. For example, Maie Soll in her 
dissertation (2015) discusses the problem of language transition in schools and its impact 
on the ethnic identity construct. For her, ethnic self-idetification is mostly based on native 
language or home language and language profficiency is the main marker of belonging to 
one of the ethnic groups (Soll, 2015: 48). The ethnic identity, however, was not directly 
connected with language of instruction in schools: among students with different 
educational backgrounds there were those, who had weak, strong and mixed Russian-
Estonian identity. However, students feel that they are more emotionally connected to the 
national group with which they study. She concluded that in general, Estonian education 
system was flexible enough to support the identity of Russian-speakers, as it was still 
possible to get basic eduction in mother tongue. The program which contained 60% of 
subjects in Estonian and 40% of subjects in Russian language was seen as the best solution 
for both getting a good knowledge of national language and for preservation of one’s ethnic 
identity. Besides, every school could chose a suitable model for their institution to aquaire 
education in Estonian (Soll, 2015: 54). She admits that every school, according to education  
legislation, should raise and develop cultural identity of its pupils, but at the same time not 
                                                 
39 https://news.postimees.ee/6142950/parties-careful-when-talking-about-school-reform  
40 https://news.err.ee/861292/riigikogu-discusses-transition-to-estonian-language-teaching-at-all-levels 
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every school in Estonia is considering this aim as essential (Soll, 2015: 48).  
However, Recommendations of OSCE High Commisioner on National Minorities (HCNM) 
underline that ’the right of persons belonging to national minorities to maintain their 
identity can only be fully realized if they acquire a proper knowledge of their mother tongue 
during the educational process. <…> States should approach minority education rights in 
a proactive manner. Where required, special measures should be adopted by States to 
actively implement minority language education rights to the maximum of their available 
resources, individually and through international assistance and cooperation, especially 
economic and technical.’ (HCNM, 1996: 5). It also suggests that ‘at least minimum at pre-
school and kindergarten levels should be taught in child’s language and curriculum in 
primary school ideally should be taught in the minority language (ibid: 6)’. At the same 
time, ‘national language should be taught on a regular basis, preferably by the bilingual 
teachers, who have a good understanding of children’s background (cultural and linguistic)’ 
(Ivanovic, 2014)41. Substantial part of subjects in secondary school should also be taught 
in minorities’ language.  
 
5.7. Towards new multicultural society: what is the mood? 
In November and December 2018 Tallinn was struck by several anti-migration protests that 
were held in the city’s centre in front of Estonian Parliament and on the Square of Freedom. 
Protesters held a meeting against UN Global Compact for Migration. These UN 
negotiations began in 2016 after massive arrival of refugees in Europe. The regualtion itself 
means co-operation between countries in terms of migration flows: it suggests states to 
gather data on international migration and still allows them to controll their immigration 
policies according to the local laws. 
However, support of declaration was seen by Estonians as a threat to their independance, 
culture and language. EKRE (Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond) 42 ,  trancribed as 
Conservative People’s Party of Estonia, which before these events was not popular among 
                                                 
41 https://philologiavt.org/articles/10.21061/ph.v6i1.49/ 
42 Further it will be mentioned as CPPE 
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voters (18%  votes in 2019 against 8% in 2015)43, suggested citizens of Estonia to take part 
in demonstrations against passing laws behind the backs of Estonian nation, as other parties 
were trying to open Estonia for a massive flow  of ’crowds from Third World Countries’ 
without referendum.44 Mart Helme, the leader of the Party, invited nation to take part in 
protests, first of all, againt the regulation, which would ’pose a long-term threat to our 
survival as a sovereign state and nation.’(ibid.) The Party has also made up petition45 
against UN Marrakesh Migration Pact which had been signed by 17 707 people. 
Smart and Healthy Estonia movement also held protest against UN Global Pact for 
Migration on Freedom Square in Tallinn. Despite poor weather conditions, protest was 
visited by hundreds of people who did not support government’s foreign policy on 
migration.  ERR has interviewed some of the protesters about their attitude towards 
refugees and migration problems:  
’One cannot chose their skin color, but they can choose the attitude to do 
something in one's home country to make it a better place to live, not come and 
take the benefits that someone else has established.’ (ERR, 10.12.2018)46 
Smart and Healthy Estonia has also launched a petition47 which demanded President’s 
Kersti Kaljulaid dismissal. Petition states that Kersti Kaljulaid has actively supported and 
pushed through the Marrakesh Pact which is contrary to the values and laws of Estonian 
Constitution.  Eventually, Kersti Kaljulaid did not attend Marrakesh meeting in December 
2018. However, Estonia’s Ambassador to the UN supported the agreement on December, 
19th (ERR, 19.12.2018)48. 
Parliamentary Elections, which took place in March 2019, have also made a lot of noise:  
foreign policy, migration issues and educational system of Estonia were on agenda of all 
                                                 
43 According to official voting website: https://rk2019.valimised.ee/et/election-result/election-result.html 
44 Conservative People’s Party of Estonia official website: https://www.ekre.ee/ekre-kutsub-toompeale-
reeturliku-immigratsioonipoliitika-vastu-meelt-avaldama/  
45 http://petitsioon.ee/ei-marrakechi-migratsioonileppele  
46 https://news.err.ee/883573/gallery-anti-migration-compact-protest-held-in-tallinn  
47 https://petitsioon.ee/astutagasikk 
48    https://news.err.ee/886076/estonian-ambassador-to-support-migration-compact-at-un-general-assembly  
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political parties. As it was mentioned earlier, Conservative Party support increased 
dramatically due to populist right-winged discourse. Elections have showed that 
Conservative Party was literally the third-largest party in Estonia, winning 18% of votes 
(Reform Party has got 29% and Centre Party has got 23% of votes)49.  
Kristi Raik, director of Estonian Foreign Policy Institute at the International Centre for 
Defence and Security, has stated that CPPE’s nationalism was radically intolerant and 
populist: this Party did not share EU and its liberal values, defended conservative families’ 
importance and feared of migration, which was seen as a threat to identity and culture 
(Estonian World, 26.02.2019)50. 
On the way of Conservative’s party popularity, Estonia was again disturbed by the act of 
nationalism and xenophobia: in March 2019, Shmuel Kot, rabbi of the Estonian Jewish 
Congregation was verbally offended by the anti-Semitic sayings of an unknown passerby. 
According to the Facebook post of Kot’s friend, who published a post about this incident, 
the man was shouting out Nazi salute, while rabbi with his two children was on his way to 
synagogue. Furthermore, he asked rabbi to get into the oven (Postimees, 18.03.2019).51 
Fortunately, police arrested the offender soon.  
This case was actively discussed in media and among politicians. Urmas Paet, member of 
the European Parliament, has stated that this is ’very serious and marked incident. Estonia 
has so far been an open and humane society, where there is no place for anti-Semitism and 
alien offense,’ (Pealinn, 17.03.2019).52 Kaido Saarniit, the Police and Border Guard told 
that: 
‘Every person has the right to feel safe in the Republic of Estonia. In addition to 
                                                 
49Parliamentary Elections’ official website: https://rk2019.valimised.ee/et/election-result/election-result.html 
50   Estonian World: http://estonianworld.com/opinion/kristi-raik-the-rise-of-estonias-radical-right/ 
51  Unfortunately, Facebook post is already deleted by the author. However, excerpts of this post may be found 
in media:  
https://news.postimees.ee/6547867/man-yells-antisemitic-slurs-at-rabbi 
https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/krimi/tallinnas-runnati-eesti-pearabi-ning-huuti-talle-juudid-
ahju?id=85622593 
52 http://www.pealinn.ee/tagid/koik/paet-juudivastane-intsident-tallinnas-on-habivaarne-n238599 
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physical attacks, the police is taking verbal attacks as well as the incitement of 
hatred seriously (ERR, 17.03.2019).’53 
However, the Jewish community of Estonia was concerned about the possible coming to 
power of the CPPE party. In their words, many of their ideas are unfriendly towards 
minorities and devide people into’ours’ and ’theirs’ (Postimees, 17.03.2019).54 Though 
rabbi himself announced that it was the first time when he had been abused, and in his 
words media had exaggerated the whole sitution (Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 
17.03.2019)55, many people are concerned about the growth of radical party’s popularity. 
As a reaction to the recent events, meetings and movements in social media have occured. 
One of the latest protests were inspired by Estonian students who study in Netherlands. 
They gathered in front of Estonian Embassy in Hague in order to express dissatisfaction 
with Conservative Party’s political views (Postimees, 17.03.2019). 56  According to 
Postimees, young people feel that the privilege of living in Netherlands obliges them to 
protest, because there you can come to the street and proclaim wholeheartedly that every 
human being is valuable, that everyone has the right to be his own and that everyone has 
the right to be free from systemic persecution, suppression and the risk of violence.On the 
31st of March another big protest was held in Tallinn and Tartu against coalition between 
Conserative, Center and Pro Patria. In the sponsors’ words: ‘the current coalition talks 
between the Center Party, the Pro Patria, and CPPE are undermining the fundamental rights 
of the people of Estonia.’ (Delfi, 31.03.2019) 57 
  „Kõigi Eesti“, which is famous in social media by the name ‘My Estonia too’, was 
established. It has gained positive reputation as a measure to support people of Estonia, 
who are of different nationality, race, sexual orientation etc. On its official Facebook page 
                                                 
53 https://news.err.ee/920951/police-looking-into-verbal-attack-on-head-of-estonian-jewish-congregation 
54 https://rus.postimees.ee/6547191/evreyskaya-obshchina-uchastie-ekre-v-koalicionnyh-peregovorah-
probuzhdaet-samye-temnye-sily-obshchestva 
55 https://www.jta.org/quick-reads 
56 https://www.postimees.ee/6547263/fotod-eesti-noored-protestisid-haagis-ekre-vastu 
57  https://www.delfi.ee/news/paevauudised/eesti/otseblogi-ja-fotod-tallinnas-ja-tartus-toimusid-ekreike-
vastased-meeleavaldused-pealinnas-tuli-uritusele-sadu-inimesi-teiste-seas-ka-ekre-toetajaid?id=85768371 
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it has positioned itself as such:  
“We can’t just sit by and watch in silence as our country gets derailed. Today’s 
political situation is putting values at risk that are important to Estonia”. <…> 
Right now, it doesn’t matter who voted for whom. Right now, what matters is 
that we all come together and say that making way for anger and putting values 
and principles at risk is not okay.“ 58 
However, the movement was soon opposed by the supporters of another view on this issue. 
The name of the opposite group was named „Eestlaste Eesti“59, which means „Estonians’ 
Estonia’’. Furthermore, this group was registered by CPPE Party and it states that Both 
groups suggest Facebook users to apply the frame for their main photo – the symbol of first 
one is a white heart and the symbol of the second one is a heart filled with the Estonian 
tricolor of blue, black and white. Although the least initiative is not as popular (7.000 
followers) as Kõigi Eesti (27.000 followers), they still may show us that the division exists 
not only among two biggest nations in Estonia, but even among Estonians themselves – 
among those, who believe that Estonia should be closed for peoples of different countries, 
especially for Muslim and African states (according to the CPPE’s political agenda) and 
those, who expect Estonia to be friendly place to stay for everyone.    
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
58 https://www.facebook.com/pg/koigieesti/about/?ref=page_internal 
59 https://www.facebook.com/EestlasteEesti/ 
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6. CONCLUSION 
Having conducted my interviews and summing up youth’s thoughts about multiculturalism, 
I came to the conclusion, that the main point of multiculturalism was seen in co-living of 
different cultures together on one land. No culture suppresses or descriminates other, as 
long as habits and customs of minority group do not diverge with the host society’s.  
For most of my respondents multiculturalism was seen as something positive, however the 
clause on suppression of smaller nations, even if they were majority population, still existed. 
Among Estonians there were several cases of strong negative attitude towards 
multiculturalism, when among Russian-speakers no one has stated clearly that this policy 
causes negative feelings. Furthermore, for most of them it was perceived as a good notion.  
If we once again turn to the works of Western social scinetists and compare their ideas with 
the ones that dominate today in Estonia, then we may find out that actually Estonia may 
not be seen as a concrete example of ’classical’ multicultural state. The largest minority, 
which comprises of 30% population, is threatened with loss for education in its mother 
tongue and, according to the campaign promises of Estonian politics, the idea for 
transforming education to Estonian-only sounds tempting for the government, though 
international and local laws in minorities’ protection suggest that at least children should 
study un their mother tongue until the completion of secondary level. The idea of 
educational transformation prevails among Estonian elites, so it is just a matter of time and 
state’s financial abilities to oraganize this transition.  
Kymlicka in his theory on multiculturalism suggests that this measure is not as promising 
as it may be seen from the first glance, as interests of ethnic minorities should be supported 
by the state. Especially, when this ethnic groups may not directly be related to ’immigrants’, 
who intentionally moved to another country in search of better life. Russian-speaking 
population, according to his models of national minorities, is someone in between national 
minorities and immigrant minorities and this fact grants them different conditions and 
rights for preservation of their culture and ethnicity. As both groups should, in his opinion, 
negotiate the conditions of integration, it would be fair to ask for allowance to at least have 
a chance to save schools in Russian language. 
 Furthermore, some of his descriptions of illiberal democracy are still relevant for Estonian 
case, as attempts to preserve ‘purity’ of the nation after refugees crisis in Europe, re-
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emerged. However, most of the ’illiberal’ tendencies of Estonian integration politics are 
left behind. According to Kymlicka’s ideas, the ideology of ’one language, one nation, one 
state’ is assimilationist and ineffective. In general, according to Kymlicka’s theory, Estonia 
may be seen as a country that implements ’immigrant multiculturalism’ policy to ethnic 
minorities, as it supports preservation of Russian-speakers’ culture. They have chosen to 
integrate and are not against of learning the official language and they do want to be 
involved into majority groups life. However, as to Kymlicka, better conditions 
of ’immigrant multiculturalism’ may be discussed and negotiated, as again, Russian-
speakers’ position in the context of immigrating models is not that obvious. Furthermore, 
it is a two-sided process that should be discussed with both sides. Estonian integration 
programme from the year 2000 also links to this fact.  
As it was earlier said in the analytical part of my thesis, politicians speak about division of 
two nations and find it unacceptable. However, these differences are normal according to 
multiculturalism policy, as long as all citizens feel loyalty to the state. For many 
Russophones who live in Estonia today – it is a homeland and many of them do not wish 
to change their country of living. According to multiculturalism policy, they still may have 
right to get education in their mother tongue and at the same time be loyal to the state and 
speak national language. Attempts to dissolve minorities in Estonian culture would be 
illiberal toward them.  
Another obstacle that dissociate Estonia with multicultural states is that approximately 
75 000 people still have alien’s passports. Though this amount has dramatically changed 
during 12 years (from 125 000 in 2006), this measure has not completely outdated itself. It 
is thought to be discriminative and it distances huge amount of people in Estonia from 
being loyal to the state even more.  
Nevertheless, according to media, majority of population in Estonia still supports 
multiculturalism and tries to get rid of radical and populist ideas, which promote 
exceptionality, homo- and xenophobia and are getting popular nowadays. However, the 
amount of people who do not support idea of multicultural Estonia at all is still high – about 
20% of Estonian population.  
Estonia has stated that it had its own version of multiculturalism, which was based on 
loyalty to the state, high command of Estonian language and development of Estonian 
culture, without abandoning one’s own culture and roots. At the same time, transferring all 
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levels of education into Estonian only, as it was mentioned earlier, would lead to problems 
with self-identification, which basically means assimilation. This method of rallying seems 
unclear and doubtful. On the one hand, its allowance to save one’s cultural heritage, but on 
the other hand, it is attempt to make Estonians and Russians/Russian-speakers ‘become 
alike’.  
In theoretical part, I have also referenced to the statement that one can change or try to 
adapt its ethnic identity in order to join the majority population and not to feel marginalized. 
I suppose that the fact that more and more young people are describing themselves as 
‘Estonian Russians’ or ‘Russian-speaking Estonians’ is not in favor of multiculturalism in 
Estonia. It may be claimed that such statements are connected with globalization and 
influence of European Union, its organizations and privileges that these institutes provide, 
however I mostly felt sense of guilt and reserve while speaking with young people, whose 
mother tongue was Russian. Most of them justified the laws and integration policies which 
the Estonian government implement, because they felt Estonian culture was too small for 
preserving minorities’ cultures. Mostly this was relevant for those, who had insecure 
Estonian-Russian identity, but for youngsters with strong Russian identity this was 
sometimes also true.  
Furthermore, during the research, I found out that Estonians and Russians put different 
meanings into the concept of identity. If the first ones connect them mostly with civic and 
constitutional rights and then only with culture and language (for some of the respondents 
the latter was not even important), then for Russophones ethnic identity was always 
connected with language and culture only. Most of them do not have wish or sometimes 
even right to vote, but this fact did not worry most of them. In my opinion, this fact may 
also show that young people do not feel included into the Estonian society and 
subconsciously do not feel that they may decide or speak out their thoughts on 
governmental issues.  
My hypothesis was based on the assumption that majority population will perceive 
multiculturalism more negatively than minority population. It was true, but selection of 
respondents was too small for evident confirmation. However, during my interviews I have 
noticed that Estonians are more critical to multiculturalism and demand insurance from this 
policy that Estonian culture and language would not dissolve in a melting pot of minorities’ 
cultures. Nevertheless, most of the young people were not against it. Russian-speakers were 
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pondering over multiculturalism as a good policy, but rather as about a dream that will 
never come true. Furthermore, in their opinion it would be fair if there were no 
multiculturalism in Estonia, as Estonians are small nation that wishes to preserve its’ own 
culture and Russian one will not disappear as Russia is a huge country which may take care 
of its heritage itself.  
To conclude, I would like to say that the theme is important and will still be relevant for 
years and interest in it will only be growing as the Estonian society develops. Further 
research may concentrate on civic and political issues of Russian-speakers and Estonians - 
more thoroughly investigate their similarities and differences in their attitude towards civic 
activity. Furthermore, it would be interesting to know, how majority population perceives 
Russian-speakers: if they are ‘ours’ or the ones that form ‘others’ in multicultural space.  
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APPENDIX 
Interview questions 
1. Tell me about your family and roots. Where are your parents from? In 
which city do you live? 
2. What is your age? 
3. Are you a citizen of Estonia? 
4. What is your ethnic identity? 
5. What does it mean for you to be Russian /Russian-speaking Estonian / 
Estonian / of alternative identity?  
6. What is multiculturalism?  
7. It is rather positive policy or not? 
8. What is your attitude towards it? 
9. How do you think: Estonia is a multicultural state or not? What is your 
attitude towards this?  
10. Do you think that Russian culture may be endangered in Estonia? 
11. What about Estonian? 
12. What do you know about integration?  
13. What do you think of integrational steps of Estonian government? Are 
there any problems?  
14. How do you think, which measures would be good in dealing with 
minorities? 
15. How do you think, Estonians and Russians are united or not?  
 
 
